Introduction

Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach” has, over the last twenty years, become the most influential contender to the dominant neo-liberal understanding of development as quantitatively assessed economic growth. As a crucial philosophical foundation to the Human Development discourse, Sen’s approach has exercised great theoretical and practical influence, especially in the UNDP, and has even been acknowledged by the World Bank. More recently Sen has come to argue that the indicator of development should be no less than substantive individual freedom, that is, the enhancement of opportunities to exercise freedom in the socio-economic and political spheres. Furthermore, Sen argues that this process itself depends upon the capabilities of people to pursue the goals that they take to be meaningfully valuable. Development agencies that follow a neoliberal faith in economic growth are therefore challenged to embrace a hermeneutical pluralism in their practices. Nevertheless, Sen does not disavow economic growth through market mechanisms as a means to promote development. Rather, he wishes to assess development along a broad range of indicators that include growth but also address life expectancy, education, and access to basic needs. Thus, Sen intends “development as freedom” to be a policy framework that finely balances faith in the neoliberal market with a freedom ethic of hermeneutic pluralism.

The recent crisis of global capitalism has led to an outpouring of concern by governments and international institutions over stalled economic growth. And these concerns have put great pressure on Sen’s ethical scaffolding of development. For example, as critics have noted, the World Bank Development Report of 2009 effectively sacrifices the holistic approach of Human Development for a focus on encouraging economic growth. In this report, uneven development is recognized as an inevitable facet of capitalist development and is encouraged in terms of concentrated agglomeration of peoples and capital in urban centres, despite the human costs. Moreover, Sen has also been taken to task by critical theorists for assuming that economic development and political freedoms are positively and causally related. Specifically, he has been criticised for not recognizing the ways in which the capitalist market constrains the types of
freedoms possible to develop, and for assuming that the enhancement of opportunities to exercise freedoms can take place without fundamentally challenging the status quo.  

Given the prevailing climate of entrenched neoliberal rule and financial crisis, it might not appear instructive – or even prudent - to provide a further critique of Sen’s notion of development as freedom. However, the following argument is given in the spirit of broadening the horizon of alternative understandings of the relationship between the market, development and freedom at precisely a moment when real-world events conspire to constrain such visions even further. For this purpose I am guided by the “decolonial option” proposed by the modernity/coloniality/decoloniality collective of intellectuals.  

The decolonial option requires not only deconstruction, but also a critical retrieval of marginalized cosmologies and delegitimized epistemes that might provide a keener insight and set of alternatives to present-day iniquitous global power structures.

In this article I critique Sen’s political economy approach for working with an episteme that makes subjects and actions intelligible only through a profane developmentalist imaginary wherein the market constitutes a paradoxically providential - and therefore sublime - arena for the growth of freedoms. I then problematise Sen’s approach through an engagement with Rastafari, a faith that articulates its subjects not as developmental individuals seeking freedom but as collective “sufferers” seeking redemption from Babylon market system. I therefore deepen – and complicate - the critique of Sen’s notion of “development as freedom” with a Rastafari articulation of “redemption from development”. By taking the decolonial option, I wish to make two simultaneous contributions. First, I will clarify how Sen’s democratic impulses are drastically attenuated by the developmentalist episteme that he extracts from classical political economy. Second, I will proffer a decolonial episteme (Rastafari) through which to interpret other-wise the relationship between the market, development and freedom.

To readers of this journal, these proposed contributions would perhaps require an engagement with the core question of Subaltern Studies: can the subaltern speak? It will be useful, then, to also briefly situate my argument vis-à-vis this debate. For a long while now, Subaltern Studies has engaged with poststructural thought and especially – but by no means exclusively – with Foucault’s claim that all subject positions are already part constituted by powerknowledge. By this logic the subaltern cannot speak because this very subject position is already an articulation of hegemonic power. In this regard, Subaltern Studies has shifted its focus of inquiry – along with its accompanying intellectual politics – from an initial engagement with subaltern struggle to the grammar of the “subaltern”. As Gyan Prakash puts it, the position of critique occupied by the figure of the subaltern has become a “recalcitrant difference that arises not outside but inside elite discourses to exert pressure on forces and forms that subordinate it.” Gayatri Spivak has been most influential in this turn, pronouncing that the subaltern “provides the model for a general theory of consciousness”. However, for the purposes of this article, I wish to engage instead with the cognate interventions of Dipesh Chakrabarty.
Chakrabarty mobilizes the idea of “subaltern pasts” in order to render the homogenous time of History plotted in the archives “out of joint”. However, he also supports the original politics of subaltern studies, that is, a “democratic project” to articulate the peasantry as political persons – i.e. as citizens - contra to their representation by both colonial and Marxist histories as “pre-political”. In many ways, this ethical intention is shared by Sen’s rewriting of development as freedom: both, in principle, endorse a hermeneutical pluralism, yet both substantively limit its provenance as I will show in more detail below with regards to Sen. As for Chakrabarty, this limitation is most obvious when he returns to Ranajit Guha’s seminal text on the prose of counter-insurgency. Against the colonial hermeneutic of the archive, Chakrabarty suggests that peasant religiosity might indeed encompass a “political structure and a political vocabulary”. Moreover, endorsing, again in principle, its epistemic validity, Chakrabarty looks towards a “subaltern historiography that actually tries to learn from the subaltern.” And yet, as soon as Chakrabarty inhabits his elite craft i.e., history, historiography and the archive, he wilfully blocks this democratic impulse and instead locks the subaltern into a hermeneutic of epistemological limits for the purposes of elite self-reflexion.

The decolonial option seeks to address this epistemic self-limitation which, when undertaken by the elites of/in the western academy, tends towards a curtailment of – and perhaps disengagement from - democratic knowledge cultivation. In taking the decolonial option I can support Chakrabarty’s project of pluralising hermeneutics and democratizing epistemes but I must also do away with the (paradoxical) privileging of the “subaltern” as a subject-position that enables an understanding of the effects of power. By this reasoning, I cannot proclaim the decolonial option to be the “post” to postcolonial approaches. But what I do want to claim is that working with the self-limiting grammar of the “subaltern” is a choice of elite craftsmanship: the critical intellectual is never faced with a hermeneutical fiat. Decolonial thinking humbles the colonial-modern episteme not only by exposing its proscribed limits but also via another intellectual labour, that is, intentionally relating to specific cosmologies and epistemes of the dispossessed and oppressed as, in principle, valid sites for critical knowledge cultivation of power and its global effects. Thus, although my critique is targeted foremost at Sen’s notion of development as freedom, the issues at stake will modulate with the tensions of Subaltern Studies, namely, the relationalities of religiosity and modernity, representation and dispossession/oppression, and the colonial episteme and hermeneutical pluralism.

I proceed by exploring the indebtedness of Sen’s approach to classical political economy and especially the work of Adam Smith. I argue that the political economy tradition rearticulates rather than disavows a Christian faith in Providence through its developmentalist episteme and the focus on profane market mechanisms. I then tease out the ways in which Sen mobilises this intellectual legacy to baptise all subjects as developmental individuals who must seek Providence (and thus their freedom) through the market. This requirement for baptism seriously damages Sen’s commitment to cultural and hermeneutical pluralism in that it fundamentally prefigures the means, ends and sites of freedom. Rather than a metaphor, I use baptism as a heuristic device that relates my deconstructive critique of Sen’s developmentalist episteme to my retrieval of
the critique that the Rastafari faith offers of the market, development and freedom. In fine, baptism, in it’s a colonial Christian articulation, marks the outlawing of hermeneutical pluralism and of “native” epistemes that are other-wise. I then explore how, unlike Sen’s baptism of subjects into a market-life of slavery, the Rastafari faith pursues redemption from such development by way of an other-wise episteme that guides a set of practices called “livity”. I will use my engagement with Rastafari livity vis-à-vis Sen’s developmentalism to suggest a broader intellectual politics: insofar as it occupies the privileged subject-position of critical intellectual craftmanship, the “subaltern” should, at least, be put to one side.

Sen, Smith and Faith in the Market

Sen focuses his critique of development economics on the “mono-concentrationist” hermeneutic of neoclassical economic theory and its concern to maximise utility. To this end, he draws upon a political-philosophy of needs. Sen argues that the language of utility focuses upon objects rather than upon what objects do to and for human beings.\textsuperscript{24} At stake, he argues, is the difference between being “well off” through the instrumental satiation of needs and the achievement of “wellbeing” through the capability to satiate needs that the individual her/himself values as of fundamental importance.\textsuperscript{25} Sen notes that his use of agency is not that of standard economic language - acting on behalf of another person - but should be understood “in its older and ‘grander’ sense as someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her/his own values and objectivities”.\textsuperscript{26}

Here Sen makes an important move. He signals a resurrection of the concern for the self-actualization of individual freedom that he takes to be central to European Enlightenment thought and to classical political economy in particular. Sen repeatedly makes references to eighteenth and nineteenth century writings on the idea of freedom,\textsuperscript{27} but especially to those of Adam Smith.\textsuperscript{28} Subverting the neoliberal appropriation of Smith, Sen reconciles Smithian political-economy to moral philosophy. According to Sen, even if Smith accepted that commercial society had replaced the passions with the interests, he still believed that the moral improvement of the human condition could proceed through the mechanisms of the later. For example, the rational pursuit of self-interest, institutionalised in the invisible hand of the market mechanism, had an unintended consequence of providing for the common good especially through its subversion of existing tyrannical and irrational systems of government.\textsuperscript{29}

For Sen, then, Smith’s work is exemplary of the argument that economic development is substantively and ethically a means towards human freedom and not an end in itself.\textsuperscript{30} In a recent discussion of the present capitalist crisis Sen once more defends the promise of Smith’s classical political economy.\textsuperscript{31} Sen acknowledges the importance that Smith attributes to the freeing of trade, specialization of production, and economies of scale. However, Sen also reminds readers that Smith believed these developments to be necessary but not sufficient for freedom, thus requiring institutional intervention and moderation as well as guidance from a moral compass when it comes to the profit motive. Indeed, Sen proselytizes that “[t]he present economic crises … demand a new
understanding of older ideas, such as those of Smith … many of which have been sadly neglected.”

But most importantly, as I have suggested in the introduction, Sen argues against mono-concentrationist neoclassical theory in order to promote a cultural and thus hermeneutical pluralism. To buttress his argument, Sen makes a crucial requisite of development its meaningful pursuit by human protagonists. And because meaning is culturally diverse, the self-actualizing of freedom proceeds through multiple interpretations of what human development entails. Put simply, if the indicators of wellbeing must be pluralistic, so too must be the interpretive criteria for assessment. For some commentators, this presents one of the most radical moves in the capabilities approach in that it requires development policies to evolve through fully fledged democratic discussion. And certainly, in the prevailing climate wherein technocratic governance even in Europe is now being deployed to contain the social disorder created by economic crises, Sen’s intervention appears to be radically subversive. Nevertheless, Sen contains the scope of this democratizing impulse – this hermeneutic pluralism - within a developmentalist episteme. To fully appreciate this limitation I will now pick up on the framing of the moral concern for freedom in classical political economy that resounds in Sen’s work.

Specifically, I want to problematize the assumption that Enlightenment thought was uniquely unprecedented in the way that it sought to pursue this moral concern by evacuating religion and God from its philosophical framework. As has become clearer in recent studies, the strands of Enlightenment thought that sought the guidance of reason and scientific certitude in order to explain the quotidian workings of the human being usually held to Deist or Stoic or (more popularly) plain Christian beliefs. Indeed, the belief in a purposeful mover that ordered the seeming chaos of earthly arrangements according to an unknown plan was not discarded by Enlightenment thought; rather, this belief formed a major fault-line within its very evolution. Smith’s writings, to which Sen owes a great deal, also bear the trace of this fault line as has now been thoroughly discussed in a debate regarding his “hidden theology”. It is important to pursue these considerations a little further because revealing the episteme of classical political economy to be based just as much on faith as science will allow for a more acute hermeneutical engagement between Sen and Rastafari.

Smith follows Newton in making a fundamental distinction between the first causes of Nature – God’s unfathomable will – and second causes that could be postulated from observance of the workings of the material world. For Smith, there is an order to nature, one designed by God whose intent, as the first and final cause, is unknowable to mortal souls. Hence, “the administration of the great system of the universe” is, for Smith, “the business of God and not of man”, wherein man is allotted a “humbler department”, the welfare of himself, his family and nation. However, human society, unlike God’s nature, exhibits disharmony, frailty and irregularity, and so it behoves philosophers to conjecture upon the spiritual progress of humanity through a profane understanding of the efficient causes by which humanity progresses in the earthly realm.
Providence must now be discerned to be working through the market mechanism and the pursuit of self-interest that, on aggregate, manifests in the common good.\textsuperscript{41}

Amongst Scottish thinkers Providence was often not even parsed through the secular rationality of Deism or Stoicism. Peter Clarke argues, for instance, that Smith, following Francis Hutchinson ("father" of the Scottish Enlightenment and ordained minister) was a "Christian Stoic".\textsuperscript{42} In any case, Marshall Sahlins notes that the secularization of the workings of "man" in classical political economy did not trespass fundamentally beyond the tropes of Christian cosmology.\textsuperscript{43} According to Sahlins, Christianity alone has a marked sense of not just the separation of the mortal body and immortal soul but, moreover, the way in which this separation must be understood as a civil war between its constituent parts. Outside of this cosmology the assumption that the providential movement of society derives from the act of sinning – satisfying base and egoistic needs – is culturally peculiar.\textsuperscript{44} It is interesting to note, in this respect, that Smith makes an argument about the special nature of passions arising from the "disposition of the body" - especially hunger and sex: these passions do not elicit sympathy from others; hence it is harder for their expression to generate virtuous actions.\textsuperscript{45}

The point here is that classical political economy still professed a faith-based episteme, but one which claimed scientific pretensions by virtue of epistemologically separating out profane means from sublime ends. In actual fact, the market was a new tabernacle, wherein sufferers could be blessed by Providence once they had been baptized into the profane workings and mysteries of its mechanisms. In other words, salvation for sufferers lay in their baptism as developmental individuals. Political economy presented itself as a superior episteme at the same time as it required a confession by subjects that they understood their own sanctification to lie in the profane workings of market mechanisms. This understanding would be arrived at through a successful education in the virtues of industriousness.\textsuperscript{46}

In what now follows, I use baptism - in its Christian connotation of initiation into a sanctified community of believers - as a heuristic for focusing the discussion of development and freedom upon the act of converting suffering peoples to a faith in profane progress wherein the market delimits the reach of Providence. I will argue that Sen’s adoption of political economy’s faith-based episteme effectively undermines his commitment to cultural and hermeneutical pluralism. To clarify my critique, a small digression is apposite into Smith and Sen’s contrasting understandings of the relationship of Atlantic slavery to Providence. When it comes to slavery, how catholic is their faith?

In his notes on jurisprudence, Smith discusses slavery at some length and directly addresses the Atlantic practices that are contemporaneous to his own time. Smith clearly believes slavery to derive from a natural propensity for man to desire the domination of others.\textsuperscript{47} Hence, even if he presents a four-stage narrative of human development from hunter gathering into commercial society, Smith in no way assumes that the politics of slavery will be sublated by the economic freedoms of the commercial age. In fact, Smith is at pains to show just how unusual the absence of slavery is in human history, effectively narrowing the niche down to a small corner of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{48} This
indicates a marked pessimism in Smith’s writings regarding the pathological relationship between the market, development and freedom. In Smith’s comments on slavery, Providence appears as a parochial rather than a universal force: not all human beings can realise freedom, even through the market.

Alternatively, and more faithfully representing the proselytizing mission of subsequent liberal interpretations of Smith et al, Sen believes that, in principle, the profane workings of the market make freedom realizable for all human beings. To flesh out this point Sen writes a developmentalist narrative from slavery to freedom that is at odds with Smith’s pessimism. Sen notes that, historically, despite the relatively high income of enslaved peoples in the American South vis-à-vis free agricultural labourers, the former still chose to run away. For Sen, this episode demonstrates that enslaved peoples chose to actualize their freedom to partake in market relations (thereby expanding their economic choices) rather than aggrandize their income but have their agency curtailed. Furthermore, Sen interprets the American Civil War as a moment where the tradition of bonded and forced labour was pitted against the freedom of the labour contract and argues that the same challenge frames and drives human development in the present. However, in a perceptive article, Stanley Engerman has highlighted the empirical naivety of Sen’s framing of abolition/emancipation in terms of a categorical movement from slavery to freedom. And much work in post-emancipation studies talks of a shift not towards freedom, but from the de-jure unfreedom of slavery to de-facto forms of unfreedom. In short, the market is the site of both slavery and sharecropping.

This digression serves to highlight the extent to which Sen’s episteme baptizes subjects as developmental individuals. Freedom must be pursued through the profane market mechanism because it is only in this sphere that Providence works. Moreover, the Civil War example demonstrates Sen’s belief that even the most unfree can/should best pursue freedom through market mechanisms. Sen’s catholicism constrains his hermeneutic pluralism: his example of slavery to freedom does not just deploy a developmentalist narrative; his example also supposes that enslaved peoples understood that their freedom was best pursued by becoming developmental individuals. This supposition is analogue to the requirement, in classical political economy, for confession of the virtues of industriousness. Alternatively, there is a tempering of Providence in Smith: not all human beings can be baptized in such a way. Considering the human propensities to enslave, entry into the tabernacles of the market more often than not supports unfreedom. Smith’s pessimism (unintentionally) gives room to consider that enslaved peoples might have to cultivate their own faith in freedom within their own sites, even if these thoughts and practices might appear non-sensical to Sen’s developmentalist episteme.

Two questions emerge from this critique. First, what is meaningfully left of a commitment to hermeneutical pluralism when sufferers refuse to be baptized into a developmentalist faith in order to become providential subjects? And second, can an alternative faith in the pursuit of freedom exist besides Smith’s pessimism and Sen’s optimism? To address these questions the deconstruction of modern epistemes and subaltern logics must pass over into a decolonial retrieval of other-wise epistemes and
associated practices. In what now follows, then, I examine how some descendents of enslaved Africans have refused the baptism offered to them by white slavemasters and black overseers, and have instead cultivated their own faith in freedom besides/outside/despite the market.

**Redemption through the Rastafari faith**

Christian baptism was initially refused to Africans in the Anglo-American colonies so that, abjected from Providence, slavemasters could legitimately mete out to them extraordinary exploitation and oppression. Over time, and especially with the prospect of emancipation on the horizon, enslaved peoples were gradually encouraged by their overseers to emulate, as best they could, the civilized mores and values of their Christian masters to prepare them for, if not a providential life, at least an industrious one. Meanwhile, by incorporating biblical narratives, tropes and symbolism into existing and varied African cosmologies (along with their epistemes, aesthetics and practices) enslaved peoples had already been cultivating their own hermeneutics through which they could explain, judge, adapt to, resist but most importantly creatively survive the plantation system.

In Jamaica, this process was marked by the founding of the first Ethiopian Baptist Church in 1784 by an African-American sojourner called George Lisle. Native Baptism co-habited with an extant, syncretised African faith-complex called Myal/Obeah. Other such faiths also appeared amongst newly arrived African peasantry in the nineteenth century, of which Kumina is a notable example. Over the course of the nineteenth century a further process of syncretising Myal/Obeah with Native Baptism occurred, and the Great Revival of the 1860s brought forth a faith known as Revival Zion. This revival coincided with growing demands for land redistribution in the aftermath of political emancipation. Indeed, Revival preachers were often central leaders in protests and rebellions against the colonial government, for example, Paul Bogle in the 1865 Morant Bay uprising and Alexander Bedward’s Revivalist movement of the early 20th century.

Native Baptism and Revival exhibit, alongside other such syncretic faiths, a “black biblical hermeneutic”. The enslaved and emancipated (often tied to the same land through indentured servitude) reasoned that the key to unlocking the meaning of the holy book was that half of its story had never been told to them by their white overseers. The key was to be found in the revelation that they, and not the slave-masters, were the people to whom prophesy assured redemption from their suffering. In this respect, Palms 68 held special resonance in its reference to Africa: “Princes shall come out of Egypt. Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands to God.” From this hermeneutic Marcus Garvey would tie the aesthetic and political implications of Ethiopianism together in 1914 to create a pan-African nationalist platform, the Universal Negro Improvement Association. At the same time as Garvey argued for self-determination of the Black race and “Africa for the Africans” he also proclaimed that the biblical God “…is the God in whom we believe, but we shall worship him through the spectacles of Ethiopia.” When, on November 11th 1930, the front page of the most popular Jamaican newspaper reported Haile Selassie’s recent coronation as Emperor of Ethiopia, Leonard Howell and other
personalities, variously influenced by Revival and Garveyism, proclaimed His Imperial Majesty (H.I.M.) to be the Messiah and thus temporal ruler of the black Diaspora instead of the British king.

Although disavowing certain aspects, the followers of Ras Tafari (H.I.M.’s princely name) drew extensively upon existing practices, rites and rituals of Revival (and Kumina) so as to articulate Garvey’s Pan-Africanism as a new prophetic vision of Ethiopia. In post-war Jamaica, Rastafari, as a movement, experienced a number of shifts in location, as well as periods of internally contested radicalization, resulting in an amorphous and decentralized collection of “mansions” (doctrinal tendencies) and “yards” (physical groupings). It is important to note that while Rastafari initially took root amongst the Jamaican peasantry, adherents will generally argue that, even if it manifested in the pan-Caribbean world, the faith has African cosmological roots. Eighty years after the faith’s manifestation Rasta have cultivated a comprehensive multi-faceted episteme with an attendant set of practices. As a proponent, I shall now use the black biblical hermeneutic to provide one interpretation of this diverse and complex heritage.

The divine nature of H.I.M. is the root of the Rastafari faith. Indeed, the cosmological articulations of H.I.M.’s divine (“I-vine”) nature is a source of great debate - often contestation - within the Rastafari faith. The attribution of divinity arises variously out of a) biblical prophecy aligned with H.I.M’s Solomonic lineage and position as defender of the Ethiopian Orthodox Christian church, b) the deep-rooted social and economic resources of syncretised African spiritualities in the Caribbean, as well as c) from the inter-generational lived experiences of slavery and its many legacies. Through the black biblical hermeneutic Rasta identify themselves as the true elect, Ethiopian - and thus Black – Israelites. Babylon, the biblical site of Israel’s bondage under King Nebakanezer is therefore the moniker attributed to the West, with holy mount Zion – the land of redeemed souls –attributed to Ethiopia, a noun that also represents continental Africa. Both geo-spiritual zones (Babylon/Zion) are imbued with cultural values and social structures at war with each-other primarily over the condition of mental, spiritual and physical slavery. The Babylonian system that propagates slavery in all its aspects destroys natural forces, pollutes the body and spirit, and most importantly, reproduces inequality in the pursuit of profiting at the expense of others. Against this, Rastafari “trods” (journeys) unto Zion, a zone purified from slavery.

As sojourners in Babylon, the question of freedom for Rastafari is intricately woven into the act of repatriation to Ethiopia-Africa. In the past it was common for enslaved persons to imagine a return to Africa upon their death; alternatively, Rasta approach repatriation to Ethiopia-Africa as a living reality. This vision was given a set of discrete geographical coordinates when, in 1955, the Ethiopian World Federation announced a land grant by H.I.M. of 500 acres to the African Diaspora as recognition of their support during the Italian invasion of 1936. Forthwith, the Jamaican government sent a mission to Africa in 1961 accompanied by prominent Rasta to ascertain the possibilities of repatriation. Many Rasta are adamant that repatriation must, at least in part, be effected through reparations for the historical crime of enslavement. In other words, repatriation is not understood simply as economic migration but much more
fundamentally as a pursuit of global justice. Indeed, some Rasta representatives are currently active in lobbying for reparations to this effect within international organizations.\textsuperscript{69} I shall return presently to the debate over whether Rasta should “develop” Babylon during their extended sojourn.

Thus far, it can be seen that the Rastafari episteme equates the market with the condition of slavery through a geo-cultural optic that envisions sites of liberation to lie elsewhere. In what now follows I turn to the un-developmental nature of this episteme, specifically, the way that it refuses to categorically separate profane means from sublime ends and the sense of temporality/movement that arises out of this refusal. To begin with, however, it is important to acknowledge that H.I.M. was a self-affirmed modernizer; although, as defender of the Orthodox faith, and contra classical political economy, H.I.M. would always invoke the sublime will of God as the decisive factor in these profane endeavors.\textsuperscript{70} The hermeneutics of faith are always complexly woven around the venerated, those who venerate, and the practices of veneration. And in this respect, it is also important to note that while Rasta hold to a particular modernizing call by H.I.M. to organizationally centralize for the fulfillment of “Jah works”, this call has always been held in productive tension with the de-centralized set of practices envisioned by Rasta as the antidote to the living death of Babylon slavery. Defenders of the faith call these practices “livity”.\textsuperscript{71}

Livity can be understood as a new iteration of transmitted and transmuted practices by enslaved peoples to carve out an insurrectionary space of righteous and sanctified living despite the mental, physical and spiritual deathliness of slavery.\textsuperscript{72} Fundamental to practices of livity is an other-wise episteme that articulates the person through a re-humanizing pronoun, “I-n-I”. This sense of “self” incorporates a collective personhood cultivated through the lived experience of suffering and a deepening relationship with the sublime, Jah-Jah, manifest in the personhood of H.I.M.\textsuperscript{73} In this respect, livity first and foremost encourages humanisation (even) within - rather than subjection to - Babylon. The latter is a deathly force; the former orientation is towards life. This is why, despite sharing some theological texts, Rastafari differentiates itself from colonial Christianity. The Church, Rasta point out, is preoccupied with death and burial because the promise of realising a sublime freedom only after death was merely a trick of the white slaveholder to keep Africans subservient as they laboured on earth.\textsuperscript{74}

Against a Christian church complicit in enslavement, Rasta argue that each one must undertake a self-critical journey; it is therefore a common notion that the faith is not given, gifted or granted by an external authority nor even discovered, but rather, Rastafari cultivates as an “inborn concept” to be “realised”.\textsuperscript{75} Moving out of Babylon is, after all, a process that is impossible if one replicates the death and passivity of mental slavery. Hence, even the “mansions” that have been centrally organized around a charismatic leader – for example, the Twelve Tribes and Bobo Ashanti – do not quite play by Max Weber’s rules, and in them it is still expected that each Rasta will seek out their own truth.\textsuperscript{76} Even amongst those that understand self-realization in terms of being “born again”, i.e. the Twelve Tribes, the self-directed nature of this realization is nevertheless rigorously defended and promoted.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, against the objectification of the African as a
living-dead slave, and against the colonial education that followed emancipation but still preached servitude, Rastafari disavows the colonizers power to baptize the Ethiopian as a developmental individual - merely a plot device for someone else’s story.

Livity is discursively practiced as “word-sound-power” activity - “Dread talk” - which disrupts standard syntaxes and meanings that keep Jah people in mental servitude to the Babylon system. For example, to “dedicate” becomes to “livate” (exorcising the Babylon sound of “dead”); to “meditate” becomes to “I-ditate” (exorcising the subservient sound of “me”). Livity is practiced somatically as the satiation of the body, a sanctified tabernacle. Many Rasta are skilled artisans and technicians, and the ethic of hard work is generally applauded. But not of the Protestant kind; waged work for unjust bosses, especially exploitative temporary contracts, is likened to slavery. In this way, Rasta acknowledge the structurally unfinished break from Babylon’s slavery that stretches across plantation times to smallholding and urban-hustling economies. I have already argued that, for Rasta, there is no freedom to be gained through the market because the latter is an institution irrevocably tied to slavery. Freedom lies besides/outside/despite this market; livity is therefore a practical movement besides/outside/despite the market.

The economic models promoted by livity in the Jamaican context tend to honour the attempts, immediately post-emancipation, to create autonomous communities of rural small-hold farmers. These models also support the dignity of the displaced farmer who currently exists as the urban squatter. Indeed, the production, preparation and consumption of I-tal food is a good example of how economic activity is judged by reference to the degree that it exorcises physical slavery. As much as is possible, food should be sourced directly and personally (unlike the export-crops of the plantation system) in a way that assures that I-n-I are grounded (rather than depersonalized through exchange relations) in nature (read, humanizing conditions). For example, Country Farmhouse, a Jamaican business run on Rastafari principles, takes great care to sustain local livelihoods and lifestyles in its soy food production, and prices its products with a particular customer in mind – a family of six with irregular income. Thus, even the “base” pursuits of material reproduction are understood, organized and pursued as a sublime redemption of I-n-I, rather than as a profane satiation of individual wants and needs. In other words, the separation of the profane and sublime into separate means and ends is non-sense to the episteme of Rastafari. This is the case even when it comes to building economic models.

In terms of Smith’s signalling out of hunger and sex as un-sympathetic passions it is instructive at this point to turn to the relations of human reproduction in Rastafari. Foucault’s proposition that no-one remains un-affected by power relations is common-sense to Rasta most of whom, after all, live in the “lion’s den”. Indeed, despite the critique that Rastafari mounts against Babylon system, the faith has in the past struggled to free itself from the Victorian patriarchy injected into colonial Christianity, its associated demonization of the feminine agency, and outlawing of women’s leadership roles. It used to be claimed, for example, that women could only come to know Rastafari through their “king-men”. However, I will not choose to interpellate Rasta women as
“subaltern” through a self-limiting grammar that supports an elite craftsmanship. Rather, I shall engage with them on their own terms as “Empresses”.

Many women have and do realise the inborn concept of Rastafari by themselves in pursuit of their own redemption from mental, spiritual and physical slavery. Largely due to the agitation of Empresses, significance is increasingly being imputed into the fact that H.I.M. broke with tradition – and the Orthodox church - to coronate both himself and Empress Menen at the same time on the same day. These issues are increasingly entering into Rasta livity at large: for example, it is not unusual to see Empresses taking on leading roles in various Rasta organizations. Alternatively, in articulating the most high as The Father-Mother, a leading male Rasta philosopher, Yasus Afari, has now argued with reference to the Genesis creation story that it is conceivable that woman was created before man. Yasus Afari also writes a poem entitled “My Mother Who Fathered Me”, a sentiment that is wide-spread across the Anglo Caribbean world. The focus of all these efforts has much to do with addressing the legacies of slavery in the Jamaican context. Not only were women and family life de-sancified but the plantation system and its successors – on a regional as well as local scale – have tended to undermine the accumulation of resources with which communities might constructively address issues of injustice and impoverishment. On this note, it might be useful to signal how baptism itself might be decolonized if its other meanings and purposes are retrieved from the syncretized African faith-complexes that are related to Rastafari.

One of the formative documents of the Rastafari faith is an esoteric treatise entitled The Parchment Scrolls of Black Supremacy, written in the 1920s by a Revivalist, Fitz Balintine Pettersburg. At regular intervals in the text Balintine articulates a strong sense of equality between woman and man, for example, “you are now equal HEAD and Pillow-heart and SOUL life-HOLD COMPANION”. At one point, Balintine exhorts every black man and woman to “Rush his and her BAPTISM”. In many West and Central African cosmologies, rivers are powerful places that intersect the human and spirit worlds. For this reason, Christian baptism, due to its combination of a Holy Spirit and water rites, has been one of the liturgies most keenly embraced by practitioners of African-Christian faiths in the Americas. Crucially, the spirits of rivers are more often feminine than masculine in agency, and in Revival one of the most popular water spirits is “Riva Muma”. This respect and acknowledgement of feminine spirituality may well have been transmitted to the members of Leonard Howell’s 1930s Rasta commune, who according to Rasta poet and philosopher Mutabaruka, had a chant called “Mother of Creation”. Baptism, therefore, need not only be deconstructed as a colonial Christian technique for making subalterns. Decolonized, baptism offers a more subversive potential: rather than a claim of ownership made on the (female) child by the Father, baptism might be practiced in accordance with the principles of livity, i.e. as sanctifying feminist agency and the place of women at the heart of the struggle for I-n-I liberation.

It is now necessary to engage with the way in which temporality is understood in the Rastafari episteme. Livity invokes a sense of movement that does not separate first and efficient causes, despite being oriented towards substantive healing for earthly bodies. Quotidian Rasta discourse evidences a strong sense of “forwarding” towards
the Promised Land on earth. However, this sensibility does not arise out of a developmentalist hermeneutic. Rather than a linear trajectory of Newtonian efficient causation, “forwarding” enunciates a redemptive sensibility of time. To “forward” is therefore to cultivate past lived experiences of I-n-I in the material world as a sublime repository of suffering in order to fully heal this condition in the present-day. Indeed, for Rasta, biblical Babylon manifests time and time again: in the Atlantic slave system, in Mussolini’s Italy (and the Papacy), and in the present “shit-stem” of capitalism. Hence there is no freedom to be gained through the act of “developing” Babylon because it cannot be transmogried into Zion.

It must be noted, however, that there are a set of opinions regarding this last proposition. Some mansions and yards would hold strongly to physical repatriation and others less so, although for almost all Rasta this issue remains an intensely political one. Moreover, any distillation of the range of opinions is complicated by the fact that many Rasta see repatriation as a long-run project in which their purpose is to lay the way open for their descendants. This, therefore, raises the question of strategic involvement in Babylon system. There have been a number of prominent Rasta who have had political careers in Jamaica, one of the most notable being Ras Sam Brown. And it is more common nowadays for Rasta to have careers in public institutions including law and education sectors. However, none of these considerations undermine the point that Rasta livity demands a healing in the present-day that operates other-wise to the developmentalist episteme. In other words, the positive movement of Jamaican society, for example, is less a development of freedom and more fundamentally an exorcism of slavery. For all Rasta, redemption from Babylon slavery has to be pursued other-wise, by moving “out of Rome” unto Zion.

It should come as no surprise, then, that standard developmental and “progressive” narratives of Jamaican society are non-sensical, at the deepest level, to the Rastafari episteme. Jamaica’s first developmental stage is usually recounted as that of the plantation economy and importation of enslaved persons. The second stage, from the 1830s onwards, is defined by the emancipation experiment in the creation of “respectable” (industrious) subalern subjects docile towards their white colonial rulers. The third stage begins with the national self-determination movement from the 1930s culminating in an independent state in 1962. However, independence is framed at its very inception as a two party system inhabited by a political class that by and large seeks to emulate the respectability inherited from the second era. Rastafari testifies that none of these stages have meaningfully brought to an end the physical, spiritual and mental slavery upon which Jamaica was founded. Rasta interpret this developmentalist logic proselytized by many Jamaican elites as a project to baptise sufferers into a faith which is, in fact, just another iteration of the supremacy of the white slave master. In this

respect it is important to note that Rasta in Jamaica have always been at the forefront of remembering Emancipation Day (August 1st) as prophesy to be fulfilled. This remembrance functioned as a direct political critique during the period when the new national elites decided to subsume those commemorations under the celebrations of Independence Day (August 6th).  

In sum, Rastafari refuses to be baptised into a faith that seeks freedom through the profane mechanisms of the market, a belief system that provides for postcolonial elites an Ersatz Providence at the price of continued Babylonian slavery. Rastafari rejects the explanatory power of market profanity in over-standing the efficient and final causes of suffering on earth. Enacted through livity, Rastafari provides an other-wise episteme that prescribes movement unto Zion by leaving the market behind in body mind and spirit, word sound and power. Rastafari livity therefore practices the reparation of suffering on earth, not primarily for the sake of profane progress via involvement in the market, but primarily for spiritual redemption of the cultivated suffering of I-n-I from the market. This is not a faith in development as freedom, but a faith in redemption from development.

**Conclusion: Redemption from Development**

Let us, in conclusion, return to Sen. I do not want to deny that a small decolonial opening is provided by his work. For unlike Adam Smith, Sen believes that Providence, in working through profane market relations, can extend to all. And unlike the Ersatz nationalism of Jamaican elites, Sen formally supports a hermeneutical pluralism regarding the relationship between the market, development and freedom. Nevertheless, the point I have been making through my engagement with the Rastafari faith is that Sen’s faith can only extend Providence so catholically by baptising sufferers as developmental individuals whose freedoms must to be provided for by – and understood in terms of - profane market mechanisms. And this moment of baptism is the moment of their subalternization.

Take, for example, how abjection from Providence is conceptually presented in political economy, i.e. in the struggle to satisfy basic needs. Sen articulates this struggle as intrinsic - rather than instrumental - to the pursuit of freedom. And yet, as exampled in his discussion on American slavery, Sen assumes that the profane mechanisms for this pursuit only exist within the market. The moment of abject struggle is therefore not a moment that catalyses in sufferers a comprehension of freedom that is other-wise and to be cultivated in other sites; rather, Sen re-writes this moment as profane incorporation into an extant universal history already written by masters. To think other-wise is to fall outside the bounds of Sen’s hermeneutic into non-sense. Fanon captures the epistemological violence of this subalternation-through-baptism in his critique of Sartre:

> It is not out of my bad nigger’s misery, my bad nigger’s teeth, my bad nigger’s hunger that I will shape a torch with which to burn down the world, but it is the torch that was already there, waiting for that turn of history.
These final reflections lead us back to subaltern studies. Fanon’s protestation could be read as an expose of the “subaltern subject-effect” of his master’s voice. And it is a profoundly instructive critique. But it is also a cry wanting to be heard. Alongside Fanon, let us walk with the reflections of Walter Rodney, a famous Guyanese activist and academic. Rodney was a historical materialist with a prestigious PhD from SOAS. Returning to the University of West Indies (his alma matter) to teach in 1968, Rodney effectively relocates his learning environment from the Mona campus to the shanties of downtown Kingston. There he and members of the Rastafari faith “ground”, that is, reason together in an egalitarian fashion that accepts the pedagogical and political value of hermeneutical pluralism. Rodney shares his historical-materialist knowledge of African states and societies; Rasta elders share their other-wise episteme and its associated practices of livity. Rodney reports on his experience as follows:

… [Rasta] are every day performing a miracle. It is a miracle how those fellows live. They live and they are physically fit, they have a vitality of mind, they have a tremendous sense of humour, they have depth. How do they do that in the midst of the existing conditions? And they create, they are always saying things. You know that some of the best painters and writers are coming out of the Rastafari environment. The black people in the West Indies have produced all the culture that we have, whether it be steelband or folk music. Black bourgeoisie and white people in the West Indies have produced nothing! Black people who have suffered all these years create. That is amazing.

Rodney’s amazement at the miracles he witnesses is an honest concession that Rastafari challenges him with an over-standing of the relationship between the market, development and freedom that is other-wise to what he had come to expect from his elite craft. Rodney is a critical intellectual trained at the highest level in the halls of the Western academy. Yet he makes a political choice to mobilise his site of learning, to democratize his craft, and to pluralise his interlocutors so that his hearing and listening are not limited to his master’s archival voice. In our austere day and age, the epistemic distance of the academy from sites of struggle has facilitated the subalternization of the intellectual through neo-liberal policies that are dragging universities deeper into the market. How, where and with whom shall we redeem our word-sound-power?

Endnotes

1 Sincere thanks to the editors and two anonymous referees for their extremely helpful and supportive comments. An earlier version of this article was presented in Osaka, 2009, at the “Reframing Development: Post-development, Globalization, and the Human Condition” conference. This article is also influenced by David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah’s intellectual work on cultural political economy.


17 Guha, ‘The Prose of Counterinsurgency’.


19 Ibid., 33.


21 For various takes on the relationship see Enrique D. Dussel, ed., *Coloniality at Large; Latin America and the Post Colonial Debates* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).


23 See Rolando Vázquez, ‘Modernity Coloniality and Visibility: The Politics of Time’, *Sociological Research Online* 14, no. 4 (2007), http://www.socresonline.org.uk/14/4/7.html; Ashis Nandy might, here, spring to mind as a useful resource. However, given the particular ‘sufferers’ (to use the Jamaican term) whom I am relating to in this article, the more appropriate reference point would be the novelist and sociologist, Erna Brodber. Her novel, *The Rainmaker’s Mistake* (London: New Beacon Books, 2007) purposefully sidelines the craftmanship of historians for the recounting of enslaved pasts and presents.


28 In following Sen’s own attribution of the influence of Adam Smith I am, however, mindful of other key influences, for example, Rabindranath Tagore and Bengali history see Corbridge, ‘Development as Freedom’, 183, and fn2; Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 8.

32 Ibid.
33 See for example Evans, ‘Collective Capabilities’, 54.
40 Ibid.
42 ‘Adam Smith, Religion and the Scottish Enlightenment’.
44 Ibid., 402.
48 Ibid., 188–189.
50 Sen, Development as Freedom, 29.
51 Ibid., 7, 28.
54 In general, see David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), pt. II.
55 For the many complexities of these faiths and their relationships see Dianne Stewart, Three Eyes For the Journey: African Dimensions of the Jamaican Religious Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
56 Ibid., chap. 4.
60 Marcus Garvey, Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey or Africa for the Africans; Two Vols in One, ed. Amy Jacques Garvey (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 34 vol.1.
64 Rastafari has now become a global movement. See Ian Boxhill, ed., The Globalization of Rastafari (Kingston: Arawak Publications, 2008). In other work, for example, ‘Keskidee Aroha: Translation on the Colonial Stage’, Journal of Historical Sociology 24, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 80–99, I have engaged with this important aspect of the faith. However, in this article I will keep the focus on its Jamaican coordinates.
67 Owens, Dread, 144, 204.
75 Owens, Dread, 22, 84, 91–95, 114.
It should be noted, however, that the School of Vision does baptize in the name of His Imperial Majesty. See Overstanding Rastafari: Jamaica's Gift to the World, 211. Some Rastafari are baptized in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, due to the Emperor’s intimate affiliation. The Church, however, baptizes in the name of Christ. See also my subsequent comments on baptism.


Afari, Overstanding Rastafari: Jamaica’s Gift to the World, 293.


Ibid., 16.


On the importance of healing in the here and now for Revival, Kumina and Rastafari see Stewart, Three Eyes For the Journey.

This is not to deny, of course, that many of the words associated with a developmentalist episteme are not uttered by Rasta, for example, “progress”, “the future”, and even “development” itself.

See Owens, Dread, 36–37.


On these issues see Walter Rodney, The Groundings with My Brothers (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1990), chap. 6.

Comments made by Prof Barry Chevannes at “Negotiating the African Presence: Rastafari Livity and Scholarship” Conference, University of West Indies, August 2010.


Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 134.


Rodney, The Groundings with My Brothers, 83.