Developmentalism, Human Security, Indigenous Rights

Robbie Shilliam


Introduction

It wasn’t European law, it wasn’t government law that was the reason we survived. It was the law of our elders, of our own Māori people. (Saana Murray, cited in Mita and Sanderson 1980)

Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf. (Commission on Human Security 2003a, 2)

On February 6th, 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi was signed by representatives of the British Crown and a number of Māori chiefs from the north island of Aotearoa New Zealand. Much of the debate on the Treaty today focuses upon the relationship of the governorship (kawanatanga) ceded to the crown by the Māori in Article 1 and the retention of utmost chieftainship (tino rangatiratanga) by Māori including over “all their treasures” (me o ratou taonga katoa) declared in Article 2. For Saana Murray, member of the Ngati Kuri tribe and author of the first quote above, the tino rangatiratanga upheld by the Treaty implied a basic principle of governance: “Māori control over things Māori” (Sutherland and Parsons 2011). This is perhaps the deepest expression in the New Zealand context of what has come to be known in the language of international fora as “indigenous rights”. However, the defence and exercise of “Māori control over Māori things” has long clashed with the policies of successive governments who have sought to develop supposedly “unproductive” or “badly managed” Māori land.

Murray is one of many activists past and present who have sought to redeem the authority of the land (mana whenua) held by the indigenous people of the land (tangata whenua) against social, ecological, economic and political colonization by settler populations since the signing of the Treaty. Murray initially challenged the erection by government agencies of a scientific reserve near Te Hapua, at the tip of the North Island, on behalf of the pūpū harakeke – a small snail that lives in flax bushes. Murray argued that this conservation policy undermined the principle of Article 2 by segregating the pūpū from its human guardians who, indeed, considered the snail to be a taonga (treasure). This valuation of the pūpū by

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1 My gratitude to Maui Solomon for his generous guidance with this chapter. Ngā mihi nui ki a koe.
Murray’s people had developed over a long period of time, and had involved instances of advancing war parties crushing the pūpū underfoot while their death-wails would give early warning to her tribe (iwi), Ngāti Kuri (Williams 2001, 132–133). In the further defence of these taonga (treasures), Murray was to become a key claimant of a protracted case, WAI262, first put towards the Waitangi Tribunal in 1991(Sutherland and Parsons 2011).

The Tribunal was established in 1975 to function as a permanent commission of enquiry into breaches of the Treaty; with an amendment in 1988, the Tribunal retrospectively extended its mandate back to 1840. WAI262 focuses upon the spiritual, cultural and ecological relationships that tangata whenua (people of the land) have cultivated with specific taonga (treasures) including sweet potatoes, forests, reptilians, birds and snails (see in general, Williams 2001). The claim highlights the use and transmission of knowledge of the indigenous flora and fauna of Aotearoa New Zealand and associated genetic resources. Contesting what might be termed the ecological imperialism of settler colonialism (Taiepa 2004, 93), the claimants of WAI262 charged the crown with breaching the treaty by denying Māori the control implied in the principle of tino rangatiratanga over all their taonga (treasures) while facilitating the commercialization of these resources as well as their genetic codes (Sutherland and Parsons 2011). All but one of the original claimants did not live to see the final report that the Tribunal released in August 2011, and Murray passed on soon afterwards. In the intervening period, “contemporary crown actions ... have exacerbated and even created new injustices” (Piripi 2011).

Can these indigenous rights be protected and supported through a human security approach? This is an important question because, of all non-state actors presently involved in advocacy activities in the state-centric UN system, indigenous activists are amongst those who have pushed its boundaries the most (see for example Morgan 2007). Moreover, it is not uncommon to claim that environmental security and its connection to cultural security fall comfortably under the broad schema of human security (Cocklin 2002). However, in this chapter I argue that the incorporation of indigenous rights into the human security framework has an implicit colonizing effect in so far as indigenous worldviews must be assimilated into a developmentalist mind-set. Richard Bedford (2000) has made human security speak to the specific geographical challenges encountered by the development project within the Pacific region. Alternatively, my critique of the relationship between indigenous rights, human security and developmentalism operates at the level of cosmology.(In general, see Beier 2005, 44–47; Sahlins 1996).

I proceed by laying out the ethos of “possessive accumulation” that arises out of the cosmology conceived by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. I argue that this ethos underpins a related set of
developmentalist approaches within the UN system, namely, basic needs, human development and human security. I suggest how the WAI262 claim is supported by an alternative cosmology and is guided by an ethos that makes non-sense of the notion that human security is best met by practices of accumulation and colonization. In this respect, I propose that the pursuit of indigenous rights is fundamentally counterpoised to the pursuit of human security as it is presently envisaged.

The Cosmology of Hobbes and Locke

Hobbes’s Newtonian model of the social world has been vaunted as part of the break with traditional cosmological understandings of order and justice and the inauguration of a new episteme of “modern” thought. Rather than deriving profane cause and effects from esoteric first-principles, Hobbes, it is said, ejected the efficacy of the latter, deriving first principles instead from profane deduction of cause and effect (see Toulmin 1990). However, following a number of works that now question the rupture of early modern and modern European thought from its theological precursors (see for example, Martinich 2003), I would like to read Hobbes’s political philosophy not as a break from cosmology, but as another story of the creation of the universe inhabited by humans, that uses the profane register to articulate a set of philosophical propositions, political imperatives and an ethos of humanity. Hobbes does all this by refocusing the natural law tradition onto the problem of individual security.

In Hobbes’s “state of nature” – a condition of radical equality between individuals which gives rise to the potential war of all against all – there is one natural right that exists, namely, the preservation of one’s own bodily integrity (1994, 91). The first law of nature, to seek peace and preserve it, derives from this fundamental right of self-preservation (1994, 92). To Hobbes, reason would dictate that this law is most expediently pursued by entering into a commonwealth wherein a sovereign power, tacitly or directly consented to, would provide for law, order and the good life. In short, the social world is inaugurated for Hobbes by a fundamental rupture with nature. Thus, the natural problem of securing individual bodily integrity requires an un-natural solution.

Although distancing himself from Hobbes’s absolutism, John Locke deploys a consonant cosmological narrative of the state of nature, but extends it further. This is especially evident when it comes to his famous chapter *On Property* in the Treatises on Government. Locke separates out human nature and its individualistic ethos of self-preservation from the profane workings of all other natural entities. Indeed, for Locke, the rest of nature is an unclaimed, un-possessed agglomeration of objects (1960, 304). Locke gleans this trope of “wilderness” from reading various European travelogues of the
Americas (Batz 1974), and he uses it to make a famous statement as to the fundamental nature of things: “in the beginning all the World was America” (1960, 319).

However, Locke excludes the human body from this fundamentally unpossessed nature. He does so by building on Hobbes’s possessive individualist rendition of the natural “person” as a being whose “words or actions” are considered as his own (Hobbes 1994, 111; see also Macpherson 1964). Building on Hobbes’s first right of nature to preserve an individual’s bodily integrity, Locke makes the human being (interpellated as an individual) exceptional in the natural world for its ability to absolutely possess itself, to be its own subject of rights. No other entity in existence possesses this right. Therefore, this exceptional subject naturally acts upon a colonizing impulse; for once this subject mixes its own labour to affect a change in external objects of nature, they become its possessions (Locke 1960, 305–307).

In Locke’s cosmology the social manifests as an effect of the right to colonize other natural entities as private property in so far as this right must be institutionally observed through contract. Social contracts facilitate the overall “improvement” of the human condition via possessive accumulation (Locke 1960, 309–315). Here, Locke adds to Hobbes’s cosmology of Security a strong notion of Providence, of a purpose to human being that is expressed through a colonial culture of improvement the purpose of which is to address a natural lack. Later, this notion becomes articulated as Progress / Modernization / Development.

And yet, it seems that in Locke’s cosmology certain individuals even have the power and right to treat certain other human beings as “common stock” by expropriating the fruits of their own labour. Locke argues that “the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut … become my Property, without the assignation or consent of any body” (1960, 307). Lesser beings, biologically human yet lacking the ability and competency to practice the natural rights of self-proprietorship, are signified as the “Servant”. Moreover, I would argue that the Servant manifests as a fundamental threat to a colonizing social order in the form of indigenous peoples. Fantasising about the state of these peoples in the Americas, Locke deduces that those who do not possess a culture of improvement are damned to the wilderness, living outside the pale of Providence. Locke implies that Servants are similar to children, so that with the correct paternal governance (including a Christian education) they might develop into competent humans (1960, 307). This differentiation between full human beings (subjects) and proto-human beings (indigenous Servants) is what maps the colonizing impulse of private property accumulation driving the English enclosures onto the contemporaneous colonial ventures overseas.

2 Locke treats enslaved Africans fundamentally different to Servants: the former can never access the protection of natural law. See Farr (2008).
While I am aware that it is no simple thing to combine Hobbes and Locke in intellectual history, for the particular purposes of this chapter I want to suggest that they can be seen as professing faith in the same cosmology and merely attending to different aspects of the security-development nexus that emerges from their narratives of creation. Two ontological propositions are cardinal to this cosmology: a) the human is separate and distinct from all other natural entities (animate and inanimate); b) the accumulation of these entities (including some humans) gives rise to the forging of un-natural and tenuous social relationships. Both of these propositions support an ethos of possessive accumulation, which is to pursue individual security by accumulating external objects through colonizing them as private property. And finally, this ethos impels a political imperative: those individuals who are judged lacking in the faculty or the will to colonize in this manner, i.e. the Servants, are a threat to human security and their lifeworlds must be colonized in order to convert them to a Hobbesian-Lockean faith.

Developmentalists Versus Indigenous Lives

Let us now fast-forward to the Cold War era, in order to rehearse a conversation between defenders of this faith and indigenous “Servants” who professed an alternative cosmology.

Robert McNamara, the World Bank President who re-invented the organisation’s mandate as a “fight on poverty”, had already pre-empted the post-Cold War reinvention of security in his reflections in the late 1960s as the US Secretary of Defence. McNamara (1968, 145–150) claimed a causal link between levels of poverty and economic progress and the incidences of violence in developing societies. In the Cold War era, underdevelopment was judged dangerous for the interests of the Western bloc to the extent that it might radicalize peasant populations (the “Servants”) and push them towards the communist East. Thus, “in a modernizing society”, claimed McNamara (1968, 149), “security means development”.

Indeed, the faith imbued by development experts in the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology seemed to be challenged by the recalcitrance of many “Servants” across the Third World. 20 years after President Truman had valuated over half the world’s population as living in “primitive and stagnant” conditions, and had then kindly offered the solution to this disorder in the form of development aid (Escobar 1995, 3–4), developmentalists were bemused as to why so many of this population did not seem to want to develop. In this regard, it is instructive to replay a contemporaneous conversation between members of an indigenous Aymara community in the Andean highlands and Rodolfo Kusch, an Argentine scholar, and his students.\(^3\)

\(^3\) The following paragraphs make use of (Kusch 2010, chap. 2). My thanks to Walter Mignolo for directing me to this text.
Kusch (2010) recounts that one of the grandfathers of the Aymaran community complained to the visitors about the diminution of the earth’s fertility. They suggested that he go to the local town, visit the Agricultural Extension Office, and buy a hydraulic pump. The grandfather did not reply, and some of the students charged him with ignorance. But Kusch recalls that the problem of development for the grandfather was first and foremost of a cosmological rather than technical order. The lack of rain was not a problem that, for the grandfather, would be solved by devices that causally acted upon an external nature. Rather, the lack of rain was an inauspicious affect of an internal imbalance, to be addressed by ritual ways of doing that accepted the thread that wove the fate of all natural entities (humans and non-humans, inanimate and animate) together within that ecosystem (see also Galtung 1981).

Kusch comments that in the face of this intransigence/dissonance, developmentalists experience depression. In line with the argument of this chapter so far, I would explain this depression in the following way. The students are actually begging the grandfather to buy the pump so as to affirm their Hobbesian-Lockean faith that humans are exceptional entities – that they alone can transform a reality constituted by an agglomeration of external objects. After all, would it not be heresy for some humans not to try and extricate themselves from their natural condition of insecurity and scarcity?

And yet, Kusch ironically notes that development advisors rarely modify external reality themselves, nor, we might add, through direct inter-personal relations with others. Rather, they refer the point of action to an impersonal office. In short, developmentalists do not practice their own cosmology. Alternatively, the grandfather’s ritual is a personal and direct commitment to a natural reality that he is already woven into. He is living his cosmology. What was the response of those distant and impersonal offices to such challenges presented by the “Servants” at this point in time? Let us now return to the thoughts of the developmentalists.

**Basic Needs, Human Development, and Human Security**

By the mid-1970s, the ILO and the World Bank, whose efforts were led by McNamara and Mahbub ul Haq, sought to address the concerns over development by taking up the cause of “basic needs” (ILO 1977; McNamara 1981; Haq 1980; and for a an overview, see Cox 1980). Critical of the way in which economic orthodoxy measured development solely in terms of growth via accumulation, proponents of basic needs highlighted instead the importance of satisfying the needs of the irreducible core of individual human existence, especially food, shelter, water and health.
But neither McNamara nor Haq jettisoned the imperative for growth. Haq (1976, 35), for instance, described the basic needs approach as simply a reversal of emphasis: “take care of poverty and this will take care of the GNP”. In other words, poverty was a problem in so far as it robbed individuals of sufficient productive means to take part in the accumulation of natural objects. Therefore, McNamara and Haq’s focus on satisfying basic needs was not part of a critique of developmentalism and its underlying ethos of possessive accumulation. Rather, it remained comfortably ensconced within the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology, as I shall now detail.

Both McNamara and Haq worked with the ontological proposition that the human is separate and distinct from all other natural entities (animate and inanimate). The natural world, in McNamara’s imagery (1981, 459), appears as an external threat to the self-preservation of the individual; note, for example, the way in which he argues for the provision of shelter and clothing in order “to ensure reasonable protection against the rigors of climate and environment”. And, as in Locke’s “wilderness” trope, Haq isolates the special possessive constitution of the human to mix its labour with an externalized nature. For, if they possess nothing else, poverty stricken individuals do possess their “own two hands and their willingness to work” (Haq 1981, viii).

It is true that the notion of basic needs implies some kind of economic re-distribution, even going so far as to address the concerns of UNCTAD by suggesting a global welfarism (see famously, Brandt 1980). In this respect, the basic needs approach provides at least an opening to critique the second Hobbesian-Lockean proposition that accumulation drives the forging of un-natural and tenuous social relationships. Nevertheless, on deeper reflection, the basic needs approach values society as a tool for engineering the accumulation by individuals of private property. (“Let a society”, proclaims Haq (1976, 36) in a Saint-Simonian register, “regard its entire labour force as allocable.”) Similarly, social welfare services are deemed important primarily because they help individuals to become “fully productive”. Even the redistribution of political and economic power is, in Haq’s (1976, 28) opinion, for the same purpose of increasing the productivity of individuals who are poor.

In effect, then, welfarism and redistribution are supported to the extent that they might mitigate the threat posed by disorderly and non-accumulating “Servants”. With this observation we arrive at the ethos of possessive accumulation, i.e. the individualized pursuit of security by accumulating external objects through colonizing them as private property. Haq’s qualified displacement of growth as an indicator of the success of the experiment called society is in fact an affirmation of this ethos and not a statement on an alternative. For it is in order to address the problem of making “Servants” productive that he focuses
upon consumption rather than growth (see Haq 1976, 35). Therefore, the problem of insecurity remains, for Haq, defined by a lack of accumulation of surrounding nature.

Finally, the basic needs approach accepts the political imperative to colonize the lifeworlds of servants in order to make them have faith in the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology. When articulated through basic needs, this colonizing impulse targets culture. For Haq (1976), each social experiment in basic needs would have to define base lines of individual existence according to cultural norms. McNamara (1981, 459), likewise, admits that the attainment of basic needs might take on different characteristics in different cultures. Culture is therefore conceived as a site of social engineering. In effect, cultures are expected to facilitate the ethos of private property accumulation rather than provincialize it by manifesting alternative cosmologies.

I have focused on the basic needs approach because it is, in my view, the genealogical foundation to the human development and human security approaches beloved of the UNDP. In effect, these latter approaches are the post-Cold War articulation of basic needs.

For example, Amartya Sen’s (1999) “capabilities approach”, the philosophy that underwrites human development, shares the same purpose as Haq’s basic needs approach to the extent that both wish to relax the obsession with growth and focus on the diverse nature of socio-economic deprivations. What is more, the capabilities approach entrenches basic needs within the development industry by making their satisfaction a human right (UNDP 1994, chap. 1). No surprise, then, that in light of the above discussion, the Human Development Index articulates the core propositions, imperatives and ethos of the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology. The retention of GNI as a key indicator of development affirms the ethos of possessive accumulation; the life expectancy indicator brings to bear the basic needs focus on consumption as a way to make even Servants orderly accumulators; and the education indicator assesses the degree to which Servant cultures have been engineered so that the poor can place their faith in the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology.

UNDP literatures often argue that human security is an innovative concept. It is not. It is presaged by McNamara in the 1960s. It is a twin-concept to human development that allows for the security-development nexus of the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology to be fully articulated for the post-Cold War world (see for example, UNDP 1994, 23–24). And similar to the Human Development Index, the three imperatives of human security support the ethos of possessive accumulation (see Commission on Human Security 2003b; Human Security Unit 2006; UNDP 1994). “Freedom from fear” affirms the natural right to
preserve individual bodily integrity in a world of natural insecurity. “Freedom from want” affirms the basic needs strategy of enabling accumulation even by Servants as a palliative for natural insecurity. And the affirmation of dignity links into the human development support for education. That is to say, that dignity, in this reading, arises out of active engagement by Servants in their polity; yet this engagement assumes that Servant cultures will be sufficiently colonized to allow their populace to become active facilitators of possessive accumulation.

Let us now pick up the challenge laid down to developmentalists by the Aymaran grandfather by returning to the WAI262 claim. What if the Servants have their own faith by which they seek to redeem themselves from destitution and dispossession?

**WAI262 vs Hobbes and Locke**

The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, signed between the British crown and many Māori chiefs (*rangatira*) did not extricate their peoples from a state of nature so as to enter into a commonwealth. Neither did it mark their baptism into a Hobbesian-Lockean universe. Rather, Māori entered into the Treaty on the understanding that they were affirming with the Crown the legitimacy of existing systems of governance based on extant cosmologies. The ethos with which chiefs signed the Treaty arose from *mātauranga Māori* (Māori understandings) (see Williams 2001; Solomon). However, *mātauranga Māori* was subverted and undermined by the Treaty partners, especially when it came to valuating land and resources assessed by the settlers for development.

In the early 1970s, Saana Murray identified the struggle at Te Hapua as precisely a clash of valuations: “land for the people and their needs as a community”, versus “land for money, for buying and selling, for making of profits” (Maori Organization on Human Rights 1972). Indeed, just four years after the signing of the Treaty, a parliamentary select committee asserted that rights to land in the colony depended upon the mixing of human labour with the soil (Williams 2001, 8). Successive settler governments worked with Lockean notions that Aotearoa was still, mostly, “America”. Before long, the Hobbesian distinction between a pre-social state of nature and a post-covenant commonwealth was mapped, by English and Irish lawyers, onto the treaty partners themselves – Māori falling into the state of nature, the Crown manifesting as the commonwealth. In 1877 Judge Prendergast proclaimed that, on this basis, the Treaty “must be regarded as a simple nullity” (Morris 2004, 125). In these ways the settler regime attempted to baptize Māori into a Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology so as to become its faithful “Servants”, that is, a proto-human yet to be sufficiently tutored in the art of colonizing through possessive accumulation.
The WAI262 claim subversively ignores this baptism and uses mātauranga Māori as the hermeneutic through which to understand what kind of control over things is implied by the term tino rangatiratanga. Let us now work with some of these understandings.

While the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology makes humans separate and distinct from all other natural entities (animate and inanimate), mātauranga Māori proposes already existing relationalities (whakapapa) between entities and controllers. Whakapapa is a term composed of two elements: whaka – the process of becoming, and papa – the ground, or solid foundation (Hudson et al. 2007, 44). Whakapapa can therefore be glossed as the process of creating a foundation. However, the act of creation is not one predicated upon the rupturing away from a state of nature into society for the facilitation of possessive accumulation, as supposed in the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology. Rather, the building of a foundation through whakapapa is more an act of uncovering/retrieving/revitalizing extant relationships.

Although whakapapa usually refers to the building of human generations upon each other, i.e. a genealogy/family tree, it also extends to building relations between all entities, and in this respect there is no ontological distinction in the relationship between humans and other natural entities, animate or inanimate. Indeed, creation stories are organized in the format of whakapapa, as is knowledge of particular habitat systems (Hudson et al. 2007, 43–44; Williams 2001, 17, 103; Marsden 2003a). Moreover, in mātauranga Māori all entities – human, other-than-human, animate, inanimate – relate to various personalised spiritual agencies. For example, in many tribal whakapapa Tāne Mahuta is the guardian of the forest and creator of the first human. In this respect, all entities in the corporeal world personally relate to states of creation that lie beyond the veil that hides the esoteric from the profane (See Solomon 2001).

Therefore, in mātauranga Māori, all living entities - human and non-human, animate and inanimate - have personhood. No entities are objectified through whakapapa. Nothing exists ownerless, i.e. “in common” or “waste”. There is no original state of nature and hence there is no natural right to accumulate and colonize entities through private property ownership (although private use rights etc can exist). No entities are pure objects, to be counterpoised to that special entity – the possessive and accumulating human subject. In short, the first proposition of the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology is rendered non-sense.

Furthermore, because tino rangatiratanga operates through whakapapa, “control over things” is not signalled, as in Locke’s universe, by a colonization of natural objects. Rather, control manifests in the
political, spiritual and moral valuation of persons (animate or inanimate) as taonga (treasures) of specific peoples (tangata whenua) who, through whakapapa, exercise control over the related ecosystem (mana whenua) and thus perform a duty of guardianship (kaitiakitanga).

Tiaki can be glossed as to guard, conserve, foster or shelter. Crucially, Tiaki proposes a relationship that is different to the notion of stewardship that informs the New Zealand government’s Resource Management Act of 1991 (Marsden 2003b). Stewardship implies a notion of ownership wherein entities in their natural state are ungoverned, unrelated, uncontrolled (wild). Hence the search for security, i.e., to retain an individual bodily integrity, requires a lifting of these entities out of their natural insecure state. In contrast, Amiria Henare (Henare 2007, 51) insightfully argues that in mātauranga Māori, property rights are “subsumed in taonga [treasure] relations”. While taonga manifest as discrete entities, they are not disaggregated things, i.e. natural objects in distinction to human subjects. Rather, their very “thinginess” derives, at an ontological level, from a fundamental relationality (whakapapa) that gains its integrity from valuing particular ancestral lineages and genealogies (see A. Henare 2007). For example, Saana Murray’s people value the pūpū harakeke because of the personalized genealogical relationship that they already share.

In this respect, the second proposition of the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology - namely, that the the accumulation of objects (including some humans) gives rise to the forging of un-natural and tenuous social relationship - is also rendered non-sense. For in mātauranga Māori the un-natural social contract gives way to relations of guardianship that can accept no sundering of the natural from the social, the profane from the esoteric, or humans from other humans.

In these ways, WAI262 subsumes the developmentalist notion of “rights” under an alter-ethos. WAI262 speaks of the redemption of genealogical relationships (whakapapa) through which tangata whenua (people of the land) responsibly exercise tino rangatiratanga (control) as kaitiaki (guardians) of their taonga (treasures). By this understanding of indigenous rights, rather than the Servants it is the developmentalist Masters who create insecurity by promoting the colonization of persons (human and non-human) for the sake of possessive accumulation.

Finally, mātauranga Māori also provides a method to check colonizing impulses from all persons (not just Westerners), articulated in the form of a question: who are the rightful kaitiaki (guardians) of the entities that manifest through any particular weave of relations (see Taiepa 2004, 94)? This question must be addressed first and foremost to the knowledge production activities of developmentalists, especially in
this era of bio-prospecting and genetic research (see Hudson et al. 2007). For, as I have intimated, knowledge in Māori cosmology is never disembodied and detached, but itself forms the personalized weaves of whakapapa. Hence, part of the process of knowledge production – or better yet, cultivation - must include a clarification of one’s relationship to the taonga under study and the legitimacy and efficacy of one’s cultivation of knowledge about it. Yet this process must also be undertaken by intellectuals critical of the developmentalist ethos emerging from the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology. Addressing this challenge is a fitting way to conclude.

**Humans Against Security**

I do not conceive of the fundamental purpose (kaupapa) of this chapter as providing expert testimony on mātauranga Māori or on the specifics of the WAI262 claim. My relationship to these entities is not of the kind that makes me a kaitiaki (guardian). Rather, I use this chapter to support (tautoko) the relationships I have manifested with various tangata whenua and their taonga (intellectual and otherwise) over some years of working in Aotearoa New Zealand. The basis of this relationship is the honouring of the Treaty in my capacity, while in Aotearoa New Zealand, as tangata Tiriti (a people of the Treaty) rather than as tāngata whenua (peoples of the land). As a relation rather than as an interest group, I must be personally invested in my support, which means that I must retrieve something of worth within mātauranga Māori that would resonate with – and clarify further - my extant understandings of a just world order.

This, then, is what I retrieve with regards to human security, its developmentalist agenda, and its implicit undermining of indigenous rights. Those who live by the ethos of possessive accumulation evaluate development policy on the tenuous security that it might deliver to individuals while it naturalizes the impulses of accumulation and colonization that in actual fact produce this insecurity. Human security must, by this reading, be a Sisyphean labour that sutures a wound by legitimizing the very practices that, with great energy, are constantly directed to cut and cleave. Alternatively, the living and vital cosmology that supports the WAI262 claim is able to provide not just philosophical insight but practical solutions to some of the entrenched challenges emerging from centuries of elite faith in a provincial cosmology that colonize the many for the sake of an accumulating few. I propose that the significance of indigenous persons now populating the corridors of the UN system lies at the deepest level in this potential challenge that they pose to the entrenched ethos of possessive accumulation.
In response to the wound of development that settler colonialism visited upon Aotearoa New Zealand, Saana Murray calls forth not the imperative of security but the imperative to “maintain [the] aroha of our tupuna (ancestors) that accepted whoever came to our country to find a home” (Anon. 2011). Aroha can be glossed as compassion, sympathy, love. For Murray, “there is no limit to aroha ... [it] is at the heart of our Māori culture” (Te Tai Tokerau Claimants 2011). For Murray, the Treaty is binding primarily through aroha rather than through impersonal contract. Indeed, aroha is one of the strongest binding forces in the universe, weaving together the esoteric and profane, relating human beings with themselves and all other entities in existence, supporting appropriate governance, and manifesting the many and diverse entities to be treasured and protected. Aroha is what concretely provides for generational survival against colonial violence. It is a gravitational force almost absent in the Hobbesian-Lockean cosmology, its trace evident only in the weak attraction exhibited by the selfish desires of individuals.

What will save us all from this wicked world system of accumulation and colonization? Certainly not the spectral suture of meeting basic needs in a universe of stubborn insecurity, but rather a loving vision of the relationality extant in all things. So to those who are in the business of saving humans from (their) nature: less security, more aroha.

Bibliography

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4 See Murray’s poem, “My own blood and bones” cited in (Solomon 2000).


