How Black Deficit Entered the British Academy

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Introduction

Campaigns to “decolonize” the British academy are under attack and critics have provided a set of defences for the academy as such. Universities, they argue, should be sites of free thought and free speech, and the so-called “right of students not to be offended” is detrimental to the ethos of these sites (Anthony 2016). Hence, taking offence at a white curriculum and a white institutional space is considered a form of “cultural policing” driven by a desire to “censor history, literature, politics and culture”. Not only a form of censorship, there seems to be an almost fascistic urge by “young minds” to “wipe away the past” in order to avoid having to grapple with intellectually difficult questions (D’Ancona 2016). And the “narcissism” bred by identity politics degrades intellectual inquiry by levelling all knowledge as equally competent, i.e. vulgar (Williams 2017). If everything were to be included, ask the critics, of what would “higher” learning consist? At stake, they argue, is a defence of higher learning as an unqualified space of critique, curiosity, and discernment against a contaminating wave of identity-politics, narcissism and vulgarism.

None of these concerns are particularly original to our present time. Take, for instance, John Searle bemoaning, in 1993, the intrusion of Black, First Nations, Feminist and Latino/a struggles into the American academy. Searle (1993) sought to defend a “traditional canon” against what he deemed to be a “multicultural” challenge that politicized the attributes of canonical thinkers and the contexts in which they wrote. Or take philosopher Michael Oakeshott, commenting back in 1950 upon the prospective instrumentalisation of the British higher education sector. Oakeshott (2004) argued that there should be no “ulterior purpose” to the scholarly conversation which, in the “gift of an interval” from practical life, proceeded at its own pace and for its own purposes (Oakeshott, 2004, 29–30).

Given these various defences of the “traditional” academy – i.e. the academy before identity, race, politicisation - I wonder where critics would place Britain’s most accomplished public intellectual of the 20th century, Professor Stuart Hall? A Jamaican youth, entering Oxford in 1951 to read an undergraduate degree in English at Merton College, Hall reflects thus:

Some of my critics believe that I wasn’t concerned about the Caribbean, or about black culture and politics, until the 1970s. It’s true, perhaps, that my publications weren’t centrally preoccupied with Caribbean or black matters. But they nonetheless formed an indispensable, active seam in my intellectual inquires, from the 1950s up to the present (Hall 2017, 169).

Hall’s wider reflections of Oxford draw together a “traditional” higher education experience with a vivid community of Black and colonial intellectuals discussing empire and its aftermath. Moreover, Hall could not take an Oakeshott-style “interval” from race. Despite a quotidian politeness at Oxford, Hall (2017, 158) recollects that “I was conscious all the time that I was very, very different because of my race and colour. And in the discourses of Englishness, race and colour remained unspeakable silences.”

It is certainly specious to place Hall against the “traditions” of the academy; but it is also disingenuous to place Hall within these traditions along the lines laid out by Oakeshott, Searle, and
Indeed, contemporary critics of efforts to decolonize the academy. Such critics – historical and contemporary – assume a space of higher learning that is constitutively discerning, critical and curious. It is a space that must be consistently defended from outside forces that would compromise, vulgarise and partialize the higher pursuit of knowledge. And these outside forces seem to come with identity adjectives (Black, female, queer) that qualify the competency of their carriers to engage in an adjective-less pursuit of knowledge-for-knowledge’s sake. But, then, take Hall as a self-avowedly Black, Caribbean intellectual. Was his a comforting-inside or threatening-outside presence?

Take also the contemporary situation that defines the marked increase of Black students within the halls of higher learning. They are recruited into less “prestigious” institutions at percentages higher than any other ethnicity; their experience of higher education is significantly more negative than any other ethnicity; and their attainments are significantly lower than any other ethnicity (see Shilliam 2016b). Some have explained away these disparities by presuming that Black students arrive at the gates of university with pronounced social and cultural deficits garnered from their familial and community upbringings – i.e. their blackness. And yet all the evidence so far points to the fact that these racialized differentials are in the main produced within the British academy and cannot be accounted for in terms of deficits that Black students bring with them to the gates of higher learning (Shilliam 2016a). This evidence provides prima facie grounds for considering that those forces which apparently seek to compromise the space of higher learning are already constitutively inside. In other words, the traditional academy itself might breed identity-politics, narcissism and vulgarism at the same time as it promotes critique, curiosity and discernment. Furthermore, these paradoxical pulls are not so paradoxical if we understand their differentiation to be a racialized movement.

Hence with Stuart Hall in mind, I do not want to presume that the academy cultivates White excellence. That is a terrible burden for white students and faculty to have to measure up to. Rather, I want to confront the way in which the academy has assumed a Black deficit - a far more terrible burden to dispense with. As recent campaigns have sought to re-contextualise and re-curate the white curriculum and white spaces of the British academy, I want to re-contextualise and re-curate the academy’s production of a Black deficit.

In this paper, I explore how Black deficit entered the British academy via a series of intellectual dispositions towards the Black presence in British empire. The etymology of “disposition” comprises a sense of arrangement as well as a sense of determination. Therefore, by disposition I mean the epistemological arrangement of heterogenous elements that come together in a particular context, a coming together that is also an orientation towards particular commitments (see in general Bussolini 2010). An intellectual disposition frames a set of elements into a coherent problem at the same time as this framing clarifies ethical commitments to the redressing of that problem. In what follows I work through a series of dispositions: “white abolitionism” in the late 19th century and fin-de-siècle era; “colonial development” in the inter-war and war years; and “race relations” in the immediate post-world war two period.

Specifically, I argue that each disposition variously grappled with the Black presence in British empire, whereby this presence mooted cultural deficiency and cognitive incompetency. White abolitionism articulated such a struggle by understanding the nature of human evolution and difference through the figures of freed-slaves and primitives; colonial development did so by considering the destabilizing effects of urbanization on the African native; and race relations turned, in cognate fashion, to the urbanization of Black commonwealth citizens who came to reside in Britain. In terms of relating these three dispositions to the conversations of the British academy my narrative engages firstly with the thinkers who occupied the first chairs of anthropology, social
anthropology and sociology; secondly, with the professionalisation of social anthropology; and thirdly, with the creation of a distinct scholarship on “race relations”. Each disposition owed something to the previous formation in terms of its intellectual arrangements and ethical determinations, and hence Black deficit entered the academy with a firmly imperial provenance.

I conclude with a provocation: those traditions of thought on the Black presence which have categorically refuted the colonial – and racialized – premise of Black deficit have tended to consolidate outside of the academy proper. Contra contemporary critics, the academy is not threatened by Black deficit; rather, the academy has yet to accept Black intellectual competence. Current projects to decolonize the British academy and to de-whiten its spaces and canons must be critically assessed by reference to the substance of imperial history rather than the fantasy of an adjective-less “safe space” for intellectual advance.

The white abolitionist disposition

In the late 18th and early 19th century white abolitionists distinguished themselves from pro-slavery lobbies by arguing (through biblical references) that enslaved Africans were human rather than things or animals. Abolitionists had, nonetheless, assumed that slavery had such a debasing effect that the enslaved could be considered human in biology only. The “freed slave” would therefore have to be trained, over generations, into the civilized competencies that would allow them to fully enact their humanity (see in general Shilliam 2013). The Aborigine’s Protection Society (APS) emerged out of the white abolition movement in 1837, one year before full and final legal emancipation in 1838. The APS mobilized white abolitionism beyond its particular confrontation with Atlantic slavery so as to follow a general duty to protect lesser-beings from oppression, even if the source was European empire, while ensuring their civilizing, even if that be through European colonisation (Laidlaw 2007). The enslaved African was rehumanized only to be inserted into a colonial hierarchy of civilization.

The Ethnological Society of London emerged in 1843 from the APS. Fittingly, given the APS’s motto of “one blood”, ethnologists understood their object of inquiry as the family of humanity and by and large professed a diffusionist explanation of notable differences within this family. However, the humanitarian concerns inherited by the Ethnological Society were, in part, cause for a split when in 1863 James Hunt established the Anthropological Society of London as first-and-foremost a scientific rather than normative association. Hunt, though, was also an anti-abolitionist, sympathiser of slavery, and subscriber to hereditary explanations of difference (see Stocking 1971). As such, he was convinced that racial difference could only be safely ordered through white supremacist arrangements; disorder and anarchy was the result “whenever the negro [was] placed in unnatural relations with Europeans” (cited in Watson 1997).

Hunt’s commitment to racial explanations of entrenched difference through physical heredity, while in the minority, was nonetheless propagated at influential levels amongst intellectuals in late 19th century Britain. And I want to unpack this position a little more, as the white abolitionist disposition in the British academy consolidated against the argument for hereditary difference.

For this purpose, we can turn to the writing of Walter Bagehot, founder of the National Review, editor-in-chief of the Economist, author of the extremely popular book, *The English Constitution*, and the intellectual responsible for introducing biological claims into economics (Levy and Peart 2009, 34). In *Physics and Politics* (1873) Bagehot argued that the body of the “accomplished man” was distinguished from that of the “rude man” due to the iterative inheritances of parents and ancestors transmitted through an increasingly refined “nervous organisation”. Only
through the accretion of physical inheritance could reason come to supplant instinct (Frederickson 2007, 303). Furthermore, Bagehot argued that the evolution of select lineages of men was a moral feat because the formation of cultured habits required, in the first place, an “action of the will”. That “rude men” were morally deficient was demonstrated by their lack of a “hereditary drill” (Bagehot 1873, 11, 27).

For these reasons, Bagehot argued that the “mixture of races” was also a mixture of “moralties” and that the progeny of, for example, “Englishman” and “Hindoo” possessed no “inherited creed” nor any of the “fixed traditional sentiments” upon which human nature depended. Alternatively, mixing between, for instance, “Scotchman” and “Englishman” was only a mixing of “minor distinctions”. Neither were the significant differences of hereditary traits amenable to cultural amelioration; “imitation … would no more make a Negro out of a Brahmin, or a Red-man out of an Englishman, than washing would change the spots of a leopard or the colour of an Ethiopian” (Bagehot 1873, 107). It is interesting to note that, to convince his reader of the irreducible and physical deficit of Blackness and what his contemporary Hunt had termed “unnatural” race relations, Bagehot deployed a biblical reference (Jeremiah 13:23) that had been a mainstay justification for white abolition.

Bagehot went further. He argued that the “modern savage” was not to be treated as an analogue to “primitive man”, as was often the case in ethnological reasoning. For primitive man was effectively innocent of the failure to exercise the will that began the process of refining the nerves towards an embrace of reason (Bagehot 1873, 136). Alternatively, the modern savage had singularly failed in this endeavour over an immense period of inter-generational breeding. Therefore, instead of a “simple being”, the modern savage lived a life “twisted into a thousand curious habits; his reason … darkened by a thousand strange prejudices; his feelings … frightened by a thousand cruel superstitions” (Bagehot 1873, 120). In fact, the mind of the modern savage, in Bagehot’s estimation was “tattooed over with monstrous images” such that base instinct congealed in the crevices that, amongst the European man, had over time been smoothed by the inherited will to exercise reason (Bagehot 1873, 120).

For empirical proof of his design, Bagehot gestured the reader to consult the ethnological works of John Lubbock and Edward Tylor (Bagehot 1873, 112). However, neither scholar had accepted the anti-abolitionist argument for hereditary difference in their writings on human evolution. I want to engage with Tylor’s positions especially, not just because he resigned his position as foreign secretary for the Anthropological Society due to Hunt’s racism, but also because he was the first professor of anthropology to be appointed in the British academy. In fact, Tylor’s evolutionary account of humanity came to significantly influence anthropological inquiry after Hunt’s death and the merging of the Anthropological and Ethnological societies to form the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland in 1871 (see in general Stocking 1999).

Contra Bagehot, Tylor argued in his famous *Primitive Culture* (published the same year as the societies’ merger) that, notwithstanding the “continual interference of degeneration”, human culture had tended to move from savagery to civilization. The fact that all cultures featured “survivals” from previous eras enabled the anthropologist to reconstruct the picture of Europe’s own “primitive ancestors” in the contemporaneous practice of the Greenlander or Māori (Tylor 1920, 21). In this regard, Tylor argued that the “general principles of savage religion”, far from being a “rubbish-heap of miscellaneous folly” were “essentially rational”, albeit “working in a mental condition of intense and inveterate ignorance” (Tylor 1920, 22).

Tylor’s approach parsed difference through cultural change rather than physical heredity such that all groups shared the basic cognitive competencies to be human instead of being racially
differentiated along hereditary lines of instinct versus reason. Yet Tylor’s generosity did not stop him from accepting the hierarchies of competency that were fundamental to white abolition’s humanitarianism in the post-emancipation Tylor argued that fixed primitive survivals would have to be superseded by the dynamism of civilized culture. True, primitive survivals were rational by their own logic. But, in comparison to civilized rationality, that logic revealed itself as deficient (see in general Ratnapalan 2008).

James Frazer, the first scholar to hold a professorship in Social Anthropology in the British academy, provided a cognate argument to Tylor in his 1908 inaugural lecture at the University of Liverpool. Famous for his argument in the Golden Bough that human culture evolved through magic to religion to reason, Frazer identified the task of social anthropology as the “study of man” via the primitive societies of the past. Using Tylor’s notion of survivals, Frazer (1908, 6) argued that everywhere civilization had emerged from savagery, everywhere “complex growth” emerged out of “rudimentary” arrangements. Likewise, the contemporary savage, childlike and socially “retarded” in comparison to civilized man, could be examined in order to evidence the “evolution of the human mind” (Frazer 1908, 7).

Frazer was careful to differentiate himself from heredity arguments, as supplied by Bagehot. Even contemporary savages were civilized in comparison to primeval man and thus demonstrated “slow and painful progress upwards” (Frazer 1908, 7–8). Yet as was the case with Tylor, Frazer’s defence of a common human potential was made at the same time as he underlined the cultural incompetencies of the contemporary savage who, if able to progress, had somehow not managed to do so at the rate and reliability of civilized man. So convinced was Frazer that savage culture would be eclipsed by civilization that he identified the task of social anthropology as simply furnishing the library of human development with a record of its passing. Considering the imperial expansion of European civilization Frazer (1908, 22) suggested that “[i]n another quarter of a century there will be little or nothing of the old savage life left to record”.

Leonard Hobhouse, Britain’s joint-first professor of sociology, made cognate arguments to Tylor and Frazer. Indeed, Hobhouse proposed his social evolutionary approach as a refutation to the positions sketched out by Hunt, Bagehot et al that “mental and moral equipment” was biologically inherited (Hobhouse 1911, 9; see also Collini 1978, 19). While not entirely declaiming the importance of heredity (Hobhouse 1911, 35), Hobhouse nonetheless defined human progress as “survival of the best” rather than “elimination of the worst”, such that the “social capacities of man” were advanced by the harmonious pursuit of both individual distinctiveness and social unity (Hobhouse 1911, 35, 54, 83, 92–93). To follow this historical process was, for Hobhouse, to follow (in Hegelian fashion) the growth of the “social mind”, meaning that the more rational and critical the individual cognition, the more this cognition would be conscious of the conditions and need for social unity, eventually culminating in the realization of a human community that exceeded the limitations and partialities of nation-states (Hobhouse 1911, 95). Herein lay the qualitative difference between “rude”, “warlike” societies and the universal movement of civilized society (Hobhouse 1911, 99).

Recognizing “divergent lines of evolution” amongst humanity, Hobhouse (1911, 119) proposed a method of “morphology” that would arrange social types so as to demonstrate their evolution. Here, Hobhouse was concerned (as was Tylor and Frazer) in marking the distance between the savage and the civilized, despite their common humanity. Specifically, Hobhouse proposed that when savage and civilized cultures seemed to share social types, this coincidence was analogical rather than morphological. Take, for instance monogamy, which morphologically speaking arrived at the end of a social evolution from polygamy to polyandry etc. That some contemporary savages practiced monogamy could not be used to infer “any deeper identity” with civilized society
(Hobhouse 1911, 121–23). Rather, it was “the psychological groundwork” that would determine “the true affinities in a sociological classification” (Hobhouse 1911, 124), and these affinities were to be adjudicated by reference to the evolution of the “social mind” (Hobhouse 1911, 144–45). In short, contemporary savages, if capable of some cultural competency, were still deficient in cognitive competency.

In making this argument, Hobhouse inherited a tension in white abolitionism, expressed most acutely by the Aborigines’ Protection Society. For while, unlike Frazer, he bemoaned the immoral effect of British imperialism both on colonial subjects and on metropolitan social life (Hobhouse 1911, 143–44), he was convinced, as was Frazer, that it was precisely empire through which European civilized societies demonstrated their universality and thus compelled the evolution of contemporary savages.

Thus, in becoming professionalised in the British academy as disciplines, anthropology, social anthropology and sociology oriented towards the contemporary savage via a white abolitionist disposition that brought together a set of elements. Firstly, Tylor, Frazer and Hobhouse mounted a defence of common humanity against a theory of evolution that argued for the hereditary (i.e. racial) differentiation of cognitive competence. Secondly, for this purpose, they mobilized an alternative evolutionary narrative, which marked a hierarchical difference between primitive, savage and civilized cultures. Thirdly, they associated the advance or retardation of cognitive competency through cultural evolution in so far as more complex social arrangements impelled more universalist modes of reasoning. Fourthly, they by and large considered British empire to be the practical – but not necessarily innocent - means by which that civilization was universalised.

The colonial development disposition

Tylor, Frazer and Hobhouse writings span the fin de siècle era in which European and North American powers engaged in increased inter-imperial competition. The potential weakness of British empire was drastically revealed in the course of the Boer War, which was only won by the mobilization of 60,000 troops from the dominions. Concern for the empire’s weakness and its “undeveloped estates” (Will 1970, 129–31) set the scene for a concerted turn towards colonial development in the early 20th century with a special focus on African colonies. Post-world war one, Lord Lugard (1922) laid out his thesis on the “dual mandate” of colonial rule, namely, to economically strengthen empire while simultaneously developing the competencies and capacities of the African ‘native’. The 1929 Colonial Development Act provided regular funds principally for the “purpose of aiding and developing agriculture and industry” but with a specific view to “promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom”. Influenced in part by the Moyne Commission into uprisings across the Caribbean, the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act led to the formation in 1944 of the Colonial Social Science Research Council.

During these decades the key aims, purposes and methods of social anthropology became intimately influenced – but by no means dominated - by the imperatives of colonial development (see Kuklick 1991). Lord Hailey (1944, 11), a figure who was heavily involved in the setting up of the Research Council, characterised the resulting methodological shift as one that moved from an investigation of how societies originated towards the “manner in which societies work”. By the start of this era in the 1920s the most influential social anthropologists of the new “functionalist” schools were separating their concerns from those of an older generation of “ethnologists”, who they associated with the likes of Tylor and Frazer. In what follows I focus on the work of Alfred Radcliffe-Brown and, especially, Bronislaw Malinowski.
Radcliffe-Brown considered ethnology to be a study of conjectures on the distant past made with "almost no historical data", while social anthropology proper proceeded by "inductive method" to "formulate the general laws that underlie the phenomena of culture" (Radcliffe-Brown 1958, 4, 8). Malinowski (1929, 22, 25) similarly argued that while anthropologists had previously sought to study "dim quaint superstitions" their concern now had to focus on how "primitive politics" and "indigenous institutions" worked in the present. In other words, social anthropology could no longer operate as a philosophy of history but rather as a method of observing contemporary societies (Radcliffe-Brown 1940b, xi). And the general feature of the contemporary period, noted Radcliffe-Brown (1958, 31) echoing Frazer and Hobhouse, was "the spread of the white race and of European civilization over the world", accompanied by the extinction of "native peoples" or their radical cultural and social upheaval. As Malinowski (1945, 2) put it, the "figment of the uncontaminated Native has to be dropped from research in field and study".

The white abolitionist disposition had marked a cultural and cognitive distance between the primitive, savage and the civilized. Colonial development, however, seemed to now be practically compressing these evolutionary stages within the sites of ethnographic fieldwork. Recognising this phenomenon, Malinowski (1929, 36–37) challenged the anthropologist, "accustomed as he is to deal with the simple mind and to understand simple cultures", to rethink the subject of his inquiry – the native – now that the lands, resources and labour of the "tribe" were being increasingly utilized by the colonial economy. In place of the primitive of ethnographic lore, Malinowski (1929, 28) proposed a focus on the "changing Native".

But what was the nature of this interaction between the simple culture of the native - with its myth, provinciality and unreflexivity - and the complex culture of the European - with its profanity, universalism and dynamism? For Radcliffe-Brown (1940a, 10), the interaction of these two worlds threatened the functional integrity of empire. Malinowski's comments on "indirect rule" are especially instructive here. In this predominant form of rule in Britain's African colonies, where order depended upon the upholding of native authority, the utility of social anthropology, Malinowski argued, was to provide a sophisticated and accurate explanation of the "deep seated moral and legal force behind native sanction" which made "a law-abiding citizen out of a so called savage" (Malinowski 1929, 28). At stake in anthropological research was:

the truth that you cannot with impunity undo or subvert an old system of traditions, of morals or laws and replace it by a ready-made new morality and sense of right; the result invariably will be what might "black bolshevism" (Malinowski 1929, 28).

These tensions were nowhere more pronounced than in the colonial development of settler-colonies, especially Kenya, North and South Rhodesia, and South Africa. One year after Lord Lugard published his thesis on the dual mandate in West Africa, Radcliffe-Brown (1958, 31), then professor of social anthropology at Cape Town, opined that the impetus for contemporary study was demonstrated by the "need of finding some way in which two different races, with very different forms of civilization, may live together in one society, politically, economically and morally in close contact, without the loss to the white race of those things in its civilization that are of greatest value...". In these settler sites, the dual mandate imperative was especially politicized by the presence of whites on native lands and the development of significant extractive industries that required the expansion of mining towns and hence the urbanization of native populations.

Indeed, social anthropologists considered urbanization to be the pre-eminent challenge presented by colonial development to the study of the native. To meet such a challenge, Malinowski proposed three idealised categories, each containing "a special type of human life, a special phase of the cultural process": European districts, tribal reserves, and then the districts in which Africans and
Europeans “collaborated” and depended upon each other directly (Malinowski 1945, 9). Malinowski (1945, 25) connected this third space specifically to townships and mining compounds. Here, he suggested, a “new type of human being” was being produced by the impact of “European civilization” on “archaic Africa”, namely, the “westernized” or “educated” African” (Malinowski 1945, 25). It was this type that for Malinowski embodied the contradictory effect of colonial development.

In Malinowski’s (1945, 158–61) estimation, the Westernized/educated African evolved through a number of stages. Firstly, he (and for Malinowski, it was a he) entered a process of detribalization as he took up Christianity, European schooling, the labour contract, administrative work, or entered into the military/police. The “overwhelming” superiority of European ways would compel a renunciation of African values as the native entered a “new covenant”. Seeking European prestige and influence, this new African would then enter the European or American university system and usually succeed in graduating. Yet upon return to the colony he would experience a colour bar in white-dominated occupations and positions that fundamentally rebuffed his aspirations to assimilate. In response, the native would fall back upon African beliefs and values; and “the more ambitious and advanced the African the more this rebound.” However, the return by the African to African ways would be, in Malinowski’s estimation, inauthentic in that it produced a hybrid form of association that combined the ascriptive particularities of tribal life with the universal aspirations of civilized life. The result was an explosion of tribal, regional or Pan-African nationalisms, and separatist institutions such as Black churches.

Malinowski’s influential thesis effectively laid the problem of disorder at the door of the African who crossed from the rural to the urban with a destabilizing cultural deficit. But I think that Malinowski’s assessment also presumes a cognitive incompetency in Africans to rationally encounter change per se. On this note, let us briefly consider the influence of Charles Seligman on Malinowski. Seligman, Malinowski’s teacher, was a proponent of the theory that African civilization - such as there was – had been introduced by migrating pastoral European “Hamites”. Seligman was also known for his attempts to integrate psychology into social anthropology. He was convinced that, although the dream-states of savage minds conformed to those of civilized minds, the division between the conscious and unconscious was “specially pervious in primitive peoples” leading to a far more “instinctual” temperament resulting in “sudden tempestuous fits of anger”, “suggestibility”, and sexual “liberty” (Seligman 1932, 204, 219). Seligman was no theorist of heredity difference. Nonetheless, his claims regarding primitive psychology resonate with Bagehot’s imagery of a mind “tattooed over with monstrous images”.

In his earlier work in the Trobriand islands, Malinowski (1954) explored primitive psychology through the function of myth – a “satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions, assertions, even practical requirements”. Key, here, is Malinowski’s assertion that myth did not function in the primitive psychology in symbolic terms, but rather as a “direct expression” of its subject matter. The fragility of the wall that separated the unconscious and conscious, the id and the ego, are as palpable in Malinowski’s descriptions as they are in his mentor’s. And with this in mind, let us also consider Siegfried Nadel, another scholar of social anthropology and psychology, and a student of Malinowski. Nadel’s fieldwork in Nigeria confirmed for him that those tribes, like the Yoruba, who demonstrated “higher mental processes” – especially profane rationalization and self-reflective moral argumentation – were more able to apprehend and find their place in the colonial order. Others, for instance, the Nupe (early resisters of the Royal Niger Company) demonstrated mentalities that were lost in magic and un-reason and were thus unable to adapt to “objective ... necessities” (Nadel 1937b, 433–34, see also 1937a).
This genealogy of “primitive psychology” explains why Malinowski did not positively acknowledge the ability of the urbanizing African to adapt the traditionally ascriptive to the necessities of the aspirational modern. After all, “adaptation” was considered by social anthropologists to be a cultural attribute of complex society. Instead, Malinowski considered the native African to be cognitively unable to adapt by reason and only able to react by resentment. Put another way, urbanization in a colonial context could not be said to develop the cognitive competency of Africans so that they could take part in civilized, complex society, despite their cultural deficit. Instead, the movement from the rural to the urban – from the tribal (simple societal milieu) to the European (complex societal milieu) – perverted such development so as to produce a disorderly and dangerous subject.

Nevertheless, Malinowski was no proselytiser of British empire. He firmly believed that even if their methods had to be scientific rather than moralistic, social anthropologists still had a vocational responsibility to atone for the European extermination of “whole island peoples”, the enaction of enslavement “in a specially cruel and pernicious form”, and the treatment of “expatriated negroes” (after abolition) as “outcasts and pariahs” (Malinowski 1945, 3–4). Given these sentiments, though, we might ask why Malinowski did not advocate for the removal of that iniquitous object of resentment – the colour bar. Instead, he (1945, 160) was ambivalent on this issue: “I am simply pointing out some of the forces which, wisely controlled, may ensure a normal and stable development but when mishandled may lead to dangerous consequences.” The control that Malinowski (1945, 161) suggested was, in fact, a dampening of expectations, indeed, a pacification of Black ego, as it were. Specifically, Malinowski pleaded for the architects of colonial development to “not preach to Africans that a ‘full identity’ with civilization can ever be reached by them”.

Hence, Malinowski was clearly disposed towards white abolitionism: while the native needed to be protected from the ills of colonial development, the native could only be civilized through a careful application of Britain’s imperial dual imperative. These considerations raise the question as to the difference in dispositions between the corpus of Tylor, Frazer and Hobhouse and that of the new social anthropology.

From Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski (despite them at times bitter disputes) we can identify a set of elements that constitute a colonial development disposition. Firstly, social anthropologists inherited an evolutionary narrative that marked the hierarchical difference between savage and civilized cultures. Secondly, they were nonetheless impelled to acknowledge that colonial development had shrunk the distance between savage and civilized. Thirdly, they acknowledged the contradiction of pursuing a dual mandate, which was manifested in the colour bar that Europeanising natives encountered in the urban milieu. Fourthly, they argued that the cultural deficit and cognitive incompetence through which natives experienced the colour bar provoked dangerous and destabilizing reactions against colonial rule. Fifthly, they believed that the integrity of empire was essential for the civilizing of the native. In this respect, the colonial development disposition was less a replacement of white abolitionism and more an intensification of its paradoxical pulls - an intensification fuelled by urbanization in the colonies.

However, not all social anthropologists were disposed towards colonial development in the same way. In fact, a few were distinctly sceptical of the dual mandate thesis – the possibility that Africans could be developed at the same time as being used to enrich British Empire. Such relatively incendiary thoughts found a home at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, the first anthropological research unit to be situated in an African colony. Set up in Northern Rhodesia in 1937 to contribute an autonomous academic voice to issues of settler-colonial governance, the work of the Institute was initially imagined as comprising traditional ethnographic investigations of discrete “tribes”.
However, Godfrey Wilson, a student of Malinowski and the Institute’s first director, exceeded this mandate when in partnership with his wife Monica Wilson he proceeded to investigate urbanization in the Rhodesian copper belt, a process that officials at the time denied was taking place (Rossetti 1985, 488). Strike action from 1935 and the rise of pan-African political and spiritual movements across the Southern region provoked especially by the Italy-Ethiopia war, provided much of the political context for Malinowski’s later remarks.

In 1941, South African social anthropologist Max Gluckman replaced Wilson (rumoured to have been dismissed at the request of political forces) but retained the intellectual focus on urbanization in the settler-colonies. Gluckman, influenced by Radcliffe-Brown and Edward Evans-Pritchard, drew issue with Malinowski’s conceptual privileging of “contact” and “change” and his erasure of “conflict”. To Gluckman (1947, 108–9) it was clear that the “Rand mines” were a field of conflict as well as cooperation in the service of extractive industries that benefited Europeans. Moreover, the separatist and nationalist forces that Malinowski posited as a third constituency were, in Gluckman’s estimation, less to be interrogated as belonging to a discretely pathologized constituency and more as an integral effect of the colour bar itself. In other words, Gluckman oriented social anthropology away from the cultural deficiencies and cognitive incompetencies of the urbanizing African towards the fundamental dynamic of colonial rule.

One of Gluckman’s appointees, Clyde Mitchell, undertook a study of urbanization that mirrored that of Malinowski’s, but provided more clarity as to the stakes at play over the future of settler-colonialism. Mitchell (1956, 28) argued that those natives who came to work in the urban areas of Northern Rhodesia tended to relate to Africans outside of their own cultural and geographical contexts through wider, undifferentiated categories of belonging. Additionally, these more expansive alignments came to be invested with representative power. Chiefs were elected to such groupings in order, specifically, to represent the labour interests of the urban “tribe” vis-à-vis Europeans who were now also homogenised as “management” (Mitchell 1956, 30–31). Such developments gave rise also to African-centred unions, and of course the African National Congress, in opposition to European interests. Questioning the salience of the “tribal” in urban politics, Mitchell (1956, 34) noted the following:

From the evidence we have at present, tribalism on the Copperbelt is still the dominant category of interaction in social fields in which Africans alone are involved. But it is not a relevant category in the field of Black-White relations.

Thus Wilson, Gluckman and Mitchell all at least partially reoriented the colonial development dispensation away from concerns over the functional integrity of empire towards a politics of “race relations”. Meanwhile, social anthropologists in Britain were using cognate frameworks of urbanization to study the race relations of Africans and white Britons as the former moved from the colony to the metropole.

The race relations disposition

In 1946 Ralph Piddington was appointed Reader in anthropology at Edinburgh University’s Department of Mental Philosophy. Piddington had written a PhD under Malinowski’s supervision on the Karadjeri people of Australia’s north-western region, and had come into trouble with authorities by raising the issue of racial discrimination towards indigenous peoples, subsequently being censured by the Australian National Research Council. Before returning to his Aotearoa New Zealand home in 1949, Piddington encouraged another LSE PhD to successfully apply as his Edinburgh replacement within a new Social Sciences Research Unit.
Kenneth Little had completed his PhD at LSE under Raymond Firth in 1944 (Mills 2010, 134; Taonga 2017). The research he began in summer 1940 had originally been conceived as a eugenist exercise in physical anthropology concerning the Black community of Cardiff’s Tiger Bay. However, in reasonings with the community, Little quickly came to shift his focus towards social anthropology and an investigation of the “colour bar” experienced by the Bay’s residents (Banton 2011). He published *Negroes in Britain: A Study of Race Relations in English Society* in 1947. Little shared Piddington’s concern for racial injustice, evidenced by his briefing paper to the Colonial Office which took issue with the “implications of inferiority, meniality, unintelligence etc which are attributed to coloured people and more particularly the Negro” (Mills 2010, 132).

In the same year as finishing his PhD on Tiger Bay, Little undertook his “first spell of fieldwork in Africa”, specifically amongst the Mende of Sierra Leone, funded in part by the Social Science Research Council of the Colonial Office (Little 1974, 1). A disposition towards colonial development is clear in this work. Little tracked the movement of from rural tribal areas to mines and towns, explored the adoption by migrants of European mores and values including schooling, assessed the increasing consciousness of European/African “hybridity”, and considered the social and political tensions arising from an increase in such a population (see Little 1948b). After his fieldwork, Little continued to teach “aspects of African urbanization south of the Sahara” alongside courses on race relations and rural communities in Scotland (Little 1960b, 256). As late as 1960 – firmly in the era of African decolonisation – Little was writing to the Inter-universities Council for Higher Education Overseas inquiring into how his department might partake in the commonwealth overseas diploma in vocational guidance by providing courses on urban growth and social change in “tropical societies” (Little 1960a).

Little self-consciously conceived the study of urbanization in Africa and race relations in Britain as one field joined by the methods and premises of social anthropology. For instance, in successfully applying for grants from the Noel Buxton Trust and Nuffield Foundation to undertake research on race relations, Little argued that social anthropology was “well adapted to the study of the enclaves of coloured people in this country” (Mills 2010, 135). Providing a report of the research so far undertaken by his Social Anthropology department in 1960, Little took it as “axiomatic” that “anthropologists have as much right to conduct fieldwork in this country as overseas”, and that “any distinction between social anthropology as the study of ‘primitive’ and sociology of the study of ‘civilized’ societies is not merely inadequate but even pernicious” (Little 1960b, 255).

There is no doubt that individuals outside of Edinburgh contributed to the building of race relations scholarship in Britain immediately post-war. For instance, famous African-American scholar St. Clare Drake wrote his Chicago PhD on the same communities as Little, in Cardiff, influenced by the work of Radcliffe Brown and Max Gluckman, amongst others (see for example Drake 1955). Nonetheless, Edinburgh remained by far the most important institutional site for introducing race relations scholarship into the British academy in the late 1940s and 1950s.

At Edinburgh, Little supported and/or supervised a host of academics who made key contributions to the evolving field of race relations. Black Jamaican scholar, Sydney Collins (1957), who actually joined Edinburgh before Little, undertook the first comparative study of “asiatic” (predominantly Muslim) and African communities in Britain, focusing on northern English towns. Nigerian scholar Eyo Ndem, undertook a study of “coloured communities” in Manchester, the city that had hosted the 1945 Pan-African Congress in which Ndem had taken part as representative for the Calabar Improvement League. A.T. Carey and Sheila Kitzinger (nee Webster) investigated colonial students in London. Sheila Patterson documented the Caribbean presence in Brixton. And Michael Banton – later to become a pre-eminent figure in the sociology of race – undertook an investigation of the “coloured quarter” in the London docklands (Little 1954). All this scholarship focused
especially, albeit not exclusively, on the African-Caribbean and continental African - i.e. Black - presence in Britain. One reason for this focus can be gleaned from Little’s (1943, 13) belief that the English population were more prejudiced against persons of African heritage “than against other coloured nationalities”, and that that prejudice was “more widespread” when accompanied by physical proximity.

Of course, the term “race relations” was not coined at Edinburgh in the 1940s but in Chicago in part as a response to the “race riots” of 1919 (Clapson 2006, 255). Moreover, recent scholarship has identified a significant North American influence on the early field in Britain (see in general Clapson 2006). Indeed, the work at Chicago of urban sociologist Robert Park was often cited by Edinburgh academics, including in Little’s path-breaking book (1948a, xiii, 18). And there are strong resonances between British social anthropologists of this era and the Chicago school. For instance, through his relationship to Booker T. Washington at the Tuskegee Institute, Park was also invested in urbanization issues within the United States and its Black South, issues which at least partially resonated with those in African colonies, as did his definition of the “race problem” along lines of consciousness of difference rather than a eugenicist biology of difference. In fact, Little had sojourned at Park’s final institution before his death - the historically-Black Fisk University (Banton 2011).

Nevertheless, what the Chicago school provided to the research programme at Edinburgh was less the disposition of race relations per se and much more a set of sociological methods appropriate for analysing race in urban settings, i.e. the idea of “district” differentiation and the parsing of household data (for example Little 1948a, 23–25; Banton 1956a, 60–62). The point I wish to make very strongly is that the academic study of race relations in Britain arose first and foremost from the politics of British imperial integrity and their interrogation by social anthropologists. In this respect, the colonial development disposition was fundamental in orienting the early academic study of race relations in the British academy. For instance, similar to Little, Banton immediately followed his PhD work on British race relations with fieldwork during 1952-3 that investigated urbanization amongst the Temne of Sierra Leone (Banton 1956b). Little (1974, 3) himself used Godfrey Wilson’s work on North Rhodesia directly in his own investigations of African urbanization.

Hence in the British academy the “race relations” problem of colony-to-metropole migration was a surrogate to the “colonial development” problem of rural-to-urban migration. There was, though, one key difference between these problems. Malinowski had supposed that the African’s sojourn in the West was unproblematic and that it was only upon return to the colony that the migrating native faced the colour bar in its full strength. Alternatively, the Edinburgh programme relocated the moment of the “race” encounter from the colonial to metropolitan urban setting.

In this relocation, Little and his colleagues transposed the difference between rural-simple and urban-complex cultures to the difference between colonial-traditional and metropolitan-modern inhabitation. For instance, in his study of Tiger Bay, Little (1948a, 4) set up the British industrial urban environment in terms consonant with colonial urban areas, that is, as Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski conceived of it: a social system bifurcated between tradition and modernity and comprised of ascriptive sanctions governed by families on the one hand and individualistic behaviours governed by vocational pursuits on the other. And as Banton (1953a, 131) suggested, the functions of “tribal” and “kin” groups were in many ways supplanted in Britain by impersonal employment exchanges and other agencies of the welfare state. The social-anthropological question, then, was the same posed with regards to the colonial situation: whether natives could assimilate to English social life by leaving their tribal hinterlands behind.
Eyo Ndem’s (1957) Manchester study addressed this key question. Ndem focused upon the difference between status gained by ascription – which he associated with the “traditional African system” – and status gained by achievement – associated with the “British social system”. Ndem noticed that Africans resident in Britain could side-step their ascriptive inferiority through achievement and thus raise their “class”. And yet, Ndem noted that Black aspiration was nonetheless dependent upon how their white “class” peers would accept their new status based not on their achievement but upon the degree to which they eschewed the inferior behaviour and incompetent norms of sociality ascribed to the “native”, such as raucous laughter (Ndem 1957, 84–85). At the same time, such aspirants found it hard to recuse themselves from their diasporic communities, and would also have to demonstrate a commitment to Black working class struggle.

Ndem’s study suggested that, while the path to civilization for the Black individual lay in self-development from the traditional-colonial-ascriptive world to the modern-industrial-achievement world, that path was in practice racialized. Now, in the colonies, the colour bar was formally institutionalized, if not always directly under the name of race. But in Britain, impartial social advance was overwhelmingly moderated through informal arrangements, underpinned by racialized judgements of the individual’s competency to inhabit Englishness (Little 1958, 6–7). It was, then, the fundamental informality of the colour bar that distinguished Britain’s urban milieu from those of the African colonies.

Nonetheless, exactly the same fears of Black disorder articulated by Malinowski are evident in the British investigations. Take, for instance, Banton: “the slights, rebuffs and discrimination - real and imagined - which they experience may afterwards cause a reaction of resentment and may lead to a rejection of British cultural values and to political nationalism” (Banton 1953b, 59). I want to clarify the stakes at play in this concern for Black reaction and resentment by turning briefly to the experience of Black university students who, by the 1950s, had become a key concern for race relations (Drake 1955, 207–8). African and Caribbean informants for Sheila Kitzinger’s study of students attending Oxbridge institutions spoke of the difficulties in constructing friendships with white peers who took the activity to be a philanthropical gesture on their part: “They speak to you very nicely, but all the time they seem to be thinking, "I wonder whether he can read?"” (Kitzinger 1960, 170). Informants reported that the relationship would break down when the white partner became “embarrassed by the Negro’s self-consciousness” (Kitzinger 1960, 169).

This shock of Black cognitive competency - on its own terms, not as a subaltern to white reason – had political salience. Ndem (1957, 86–87) noted that the success of Black university students was of importance to Black residents in Britain in so far as this success challenged the general ascription of Black “inferiority”. Meanwhile, Banton observed that “leaders of public opinion” now realized that the racist treatment of students in Britain could be detrimental to the integrity of the Commonwealth and that such students had to be re-imagined as “leaders of the rising coloured nations whose friendship is important to the imperial country” (Banton 1953b, 57; Richmond 1955, 382) Alternatively Philip Garigue framed his study of the West African Student’s Union in terms of the shift amongst participating students from a confrontation with the British “colour bar” to a formulation of anti-colonial sentiments. The Union, in Garigue’s (1953, 69) estimation, by addressing the “stresses and strains that living in Britain produced”, inculcated its members with a “new consciousness of their own value and capacity for achievement”.

Clearly, the danger of Black resentment of and reaction to the colour bar was identified in the radicalization of Commonwealth student politics. And, given the political import of the “Negro’s self-consciousness” at this point in time I want to track a shift in Banton away from a “Malinowskian” apprehension of Black deficit. This is a crucial task, considering Banton’s trajectory in consolidating the sociological study of race relations in the British academy.
Key in this respect was Banton’s increasing use of the “in-group”/“out-group” distinction and its measurement of “social distance” (Banton 1953a, 131; see also Richmond 1954; Manley 1955). I want to focus, here, on the influence of Clyde Mitchell’s work at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. In Banton’s estimation, Mitchell’s work had “methodological virtues” principally in its deployment of the Bogardus “social distance scale” for use in the African urban milieu. Banton also argued for the utility of Mitchell’s study “because inter-tribal relations in urban areas provide an admirable field for the study of categorical relationships” (Banton 1960, 177). Of special importance, for Banton, was Mitchell’s explanation of the variable perception of social distance when parsed through the sociological figure of the “stranger”.

Banton specifically drew upon Mitchell’s suggestion that hospitality to the “stranger” was a customary duty that had “relatively little significance” in the urban area as opposed to the significance of such a duty when it came to allowing the stranger to permanently occupy tribal land (Banton 1960, 177). From Mitchell’s distinction between the relative weightiness of rural and urban affiliations in the colonial context, Banton provided a broader proposition: the category of the “stranger” determined social distance, but that not all strangers were equal in all contexts: some held particular characteristics that would mark their distance more (Banton 1960, 175).

Henceforth Banton argued, in a book he later described as a “synthesis of the Edinburgh research” (2011), that race relations in Britain could be understood in terms of the changing nature of the “customary image of the coloured man ... and his place in society” (Banton 1959a, 95). In some situations, older apprehensions remained to imbue in the Black stranger a special distance, i.e. Black students inhabiting mixed sex hostels; but in other situations, i.e. in single-sex hostels, the colonial distance was shrinking (Banton 1959a, 95). In other words, the severity of the informal colour bar could be assessed by the degree to which particular contexts made the Black body more of a dangerous stranger than at other times and places.

Banton’s methodological innovation had a subtle but crucial political effect. Because the “coloured man” was now to be considered “a stranger to British ways”, his cultural deficit and cognitive incompetence was no longer to be parsed through the substantive question of imperial rule but rather as a sociological problem of rule recognition. As Banton put it, the figure of the stranger is “not only uncertain of the [societal] norms: he cannot read the signs” (Banton 1959a, 97). Certainly, Banton’s application of “social difference” was far removed from Hobhouse’s hierarchy of social morphologies. And in some sense, the sociologising of race relations averted Banton from following Malinowski’s attribution of cognitive incompetency to Black urban residents, an attribution that Banton had effectively flirted with some years prior, as I have noted above. Nevertheless, in leaving the colonial field behind, Banton analogised the native to the stranger and attenuated the empire to the nation. As Chris Waters (1997) has lucidly detailed, this stranger trope proved popular with the race relations scholarship of the 1960s. But could the Black commonwealth subjects of Banton’s inquiry so easily analogise and attenuate their racist experiences?¹

Let me explain my concern. The race relations disposition first appeared in British academia as a surrogate to colonial development and bound to the integrity of empire. As was evident in the critiques made by Wilson, Gluckman (who by the 1950s had founded the “Manchester school” of sociology) and Mitchell, the reorientation away from a functional concern for empire necessarily committed the scholar to a politics of race relations. This commitment was clear in the Edinburgh scholars, and in this respect I take exception to Jenny Bourne’s (1980) damning assessment that the

¹ Banton (2011) has responded to this critique in terms of what he considers was a failure to clarify his analytical “concern with interpersonal relations”.
authors I have just reviewed “put the responsibility for change entirely on the blacks”. Sydney Collins, for one, consistently argued that the “immigrant community” could not be studied exclusive to its co-constitutive relationship to the “host society” (Collins 1957, 15). And even Banton was clear as to where the fundamental problem of race relations lay:

“the small tribal group is not the obstacle to assimilation which it is sometimes thought, for lack of organization on the part of the immigrants does not aid assimilation when the principle obstacle is created by the other group” (Banton 1953a, 133).

Nonetheless, in the new disposition of race relations, Black cultural deficit and cognitive incompetence - key elements to the white abolitionism and colonial development dispositions - were abstracted into the sociological figure of the stranger. But as this disposition consolidated in the British academy, which academics explicitly refuted the elements of cultural deficit and cognitive incompetency that they had inherited? A “disposition”, it will be remembered, is an arranging of heterogenous elements into an orientation towards particular commitments. Intellectually, a disposition frames a set of elements into a coherent problem at the same time as this framing clarifies ethical commitments to the redress of that problem. One cannot shift a disposition only through moral outcry or even through policy debate. What is required is a realigning of all the elements that orient the scholar towards her research commitments. As the race relations disposition became consolidated, where was the sustained historical, methodological and conceptual refutation of the colonial premises of Black deficit addressed to the academy itself?

Let me flesh out this critique by way of an example. In 1946 Kenneth Little bemoaned the fact that North American media and British education had represented the Black person as having “no history of culture, religion, legal or ethical behaviour”. Little sought to correct this assumption by quoting his PhD mentor, Raymond Firth: “In primitive society we are not dealing with the mind of a child ... [w]e are dealing with the mind of a man with a definite system of knowledge and technique, adaptable, willing to learn, and capable of profiting by the lessons of experience” (Little 1946, 7). Firth’s comments, it should be noted, induce a colonial hierarchy of rationalities. But that is not all. In a defence of the practical utility of social anthropology, Firth (1944, 20), (a member of the Colonial Social Science Research Council at the time that Little completed his PhD on Tiger Bay), argued in a normative register that integrated societies based upon “values of co-operation and common ideals” were preferable to disintegrative ones; and colonial development was indeed “creating new, wider, and more complex relationships.”

In defence of Black humanity, Little left undisturbed not only the colonial hierarchy into which that humanity would now be (unfavourably) inserted but also the associated assumption that only complex, integrative societies (European imperial/commonwealth ones) could solve the problem of race relations. Whose cognitive competencies required development? Who did empire ultimately “put the responsibility for change on”? I ask these questions with this in mind: as Banton developed his notion of social distance and the stranger, Stuart Hall was studying in the halls of Oxford as, in his terms, a “familiar stranger”. There is an avowed self-reflexivity here, one that demonstrates that the complexity of sociological and anthropological lore was possessed far more by the Black native than the white metropolitan. In the halls of Oxford, Hall proceeded to reason with fellow colonial intellectuals on the “values of co-operation and common ideals” torturously being negotiated at the time towards a West Indian federation (Hall 2017, 158–69). This, with all the embarrassing accoutrements of “Negro self-consciousness”.

Conclusion
As the field of race relations was consolidated in the British academy so did its disposition remain colonial in so far as Black deficit was left an unspoken – albeit latent - premise. In order to scope out the salience and legacies of this premise in the British academy I want to conclude by providing a brief sketch of largely extra-academic paths of Black scholarship on the Black presence in Britain.

In 1963 Jim Rose, at the invitation of Philip Mason, director of the Institute of Race Relations, initiated a Survey of Race Relations (IRR), which eventuated in a landmark publication, *Colour and Citizenship*. Banton (1959b) had provided the first article for the Institute’s journal, which made the case for the utility of a sociological approach to race relations. But by the early 1970s the field had become politicized with the influence of civil rights, Black Power and liberation struggle. Ambalavaner Sivanandan led a “palace coup” at the IRR which eventuated in the revamping of the institute’s journal into an explicitly anti-imperial digest, *Race and Class*. The new journal never enjoyed a strictly academic home. Meanwhile, another breakaway group, gravitating around Darcus Howe, Farrukh Dhondy and Linton Kwesi Johnson, published *Race Today*. The journal’s tagline, “voice of the Black Community in Britain”, signalled the liminal position, vis-à-vis the Academy, of mainly Black and Asian scholars who sought to promote independent Black thought on the Black condition.

The successful radicalization of “cultural studies” by Stuart Hall during this era is the exception that proved the rule. Notably, Hall joined the Open University in 1979, an institution that focused upon distance learning for “non-traditional” students. While Hall’s project situated race and the Black presence within Britain’s post-colonial malaise, the field of avowedly Black Cultural Studies gestated mainly in North America (with a number of Black British academics migrating to carve out careers). Consider, also, the career trajectory of Beverley Bryan, a former Black Panther and founding member of the Brixton Black Women’s Group who, receiving a PhD from the University of London, made an academic career only by re-locating to the University of West Indies. An academic tradition of Black thought on race, citizenship and empire – or, as it was to be known in the United States, Black Studies – never galvanised in Britain, excepting the longevity of intellectuals such as Gus John, Suzanne Scafe and Harry Goulbourne. Many Black scholars also walked the line between community activism and university teaching. Take, for instance, Devon Thomas, employed by Goldsmith College’s Sociology and Anthropology department in 1975 working especially in the Community Studies section, and six years later a member of the Brixton Defence Campaign, assembled after the 1981 uprisings.

Where such a tradition – or traditions – firmly coalesced was outside of academia proper, in community-based institutions and initiatives. There, Black history and Black education was galvanised in the 1970s alongside and autonomous to the work of Hall et al. Some from those early days still write, teach and organize in a community setting, such as Cecil Gutmore who with Jackie Lewis hold weekly education sessions in Brixton under the Pan-African Society Community Forum. Len Garrison’s work in Black community education led to the opening of the Black Cultural Archives in 1981, which now enjoys its own building and exhibition space in Windrush Square. The Black Parents movement, initiated in 1975, attests especially to the relentless and under-acknowledged work and intellect of Black women in struggles against the educational maltreatment of their children. John LaRose and Jessica Huntley (a member of the Black Parents movement) became co-directors of the International Book Fairs of Radical Black and Third World Books, which ran from 1982 to 1995. New Beacon Books and Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications – as well as more recent fora such as Dr Lez Henry’s Nu-Beyond - testify to the vitality of extra-academic Black publishing. Bogle-L’Ouverture provided readers with the commanding thoughts of Walter Rodney as he “grounded”

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*2 It is in this historical context that we should note the importance of the Black Studies programme being currently set up at Birmingham City University.*
with his brethren and sistren in the dungles of Kingston, Jamaica rather than inside the gates of the Mona Campus of the University of the West Indies. (Previously, the campus had been part of the collegiate system of the University of London and its quotidian acronym was not UWI but UC (University College). Rastafari preferred the term “U Blind”). Meanwhile, countless reasoning circles of Rastafari in Britain - in spaces such as the United Black People’s Improvement Organisation - sharpened analyses of racism, colonialism and Black redemption.

I provide this brief, partial – and somewhat London-centric – historical sketch simply to make the point that, outside of academia, there has been no end of intellectual initiatives that are premised on the valuation of Black family and community as worldly sites of edification rather than a dangerous ghetto of cultural deficit that breeds cognitive incompetency (see especially Wright, Standen, and Patel 2010). Compare to academia. In the same year that Jim Rose embarked on the national survey of race relations, the Robbins Report announced the expansion of higher education in an age that had set itself the ideal of an “equality of opportunity”. Yet despite Lord Robbins’ “natural egalitarianism” (O’Brien 1988, 120), his 1963 report was silent upon the challenges posed to these principles by the structural racism of British society (Morley 1997, 237), evidenced one year earlier by the passing of the Commonwealth Immigration Act and one year later by the infamous Smethwick election in 1964. In 1985, the Swann Report finally refuted eugenicist explanations for the under-attainment of Black students in secondary education. Higher education in Britain has never had a Swann Report.

This paper has sought to trace how Black deficit entered the British academy. The assumption that Black people enter the urban/the modern/the English milieu with a dangerously destabilizing cultural deficiency and cognitive incompetency remains to be categorically and institutionally refuted. For as long as this remains the case, the academy will remain a whitespace (see Brodber 1997). Current initiatives by staff, students and activists to decolonize the academy should by contextualised and critically assessed vis-à-vis this legacy. New intellectual dispositions are required that do not fall back on white abolitionism or colonial development but rather confidently and critically orient “Negro self-consciousness” towards the pressing problems of our age.

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